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Introduction: The Emperor System in Japanese History from 1868 to 1989

When the Meiji Restoration of 1868 returned sovereignty to the Japanese imperial
monarchy, Japan would transition away from a feudal caste based system and make rapid
internal changes that mimicked the structures of the Western world, and emerge as the first
modern nation state in East Asia. While the Western world hoped Japan’s modernizations would
encourage the rest of East Asia to follow, they also perceived Japan’s swift accomplishments as a
huge success. The German Empire especially shared a close relationship with Japan as it
supported Japan in developing into a modern nation state. The Prussian Constitution would serve
as the prototype model to base the structure of the Meiji Constitution (1890-1947) that had been
promulgated a month after the Imperial Rescript on Education (October 1890). Together these
two documents politically legitimized Japan’s claim to imperial modernity and inaugurated a
state orthodoxy of emperor-centered nationalism called tennōsei ideology, in turn producing the
civic edification of “national polity” called kokutai.1 In this thesis I trace the discourses on
modern Japanese imperial ideology by analyzing Japan's appropriation of Western culture and
traditions, which produced an emperor centered nationalistic state, and then explore how the
values of imperial orthodoxies unilaterally shaped the nation's internal and external values such
as truth and justice. I will argue that the stability of emperor centered nationalism was dependent
upon the preservation of the emperor's sacredness as a living god in the minds of the public.
In my first chapter, I trace the methodologies used to indoctrinate the state into believing
the royal lineage were living descendants from the sun goddess, Amaterasu. In order to restore
sovereignty to the emperor in the eyes of Japan, solidifying the emperor’s image was crucial.

Tennōsei is written as 天皇制 and literally translates to: (天 ten) heavenly, (皇 ou) emperor, (制,sei) system.
Kokutai is written as 国体 and literally translates to: (国,koku) country, ( 体,tai) body.
1
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The founding fathers of the Meiji period set out to fabricate and invent traditions that were
appropriations of Western cultures, but promoted under the notion that the oligarchs were
resurrecting a forgotten culture that had previously existed in ancient Japanese times. Ideologies
surrounding the concept of tennōsei articulated a strict spiritual relationship between the emperor
and his subjects. For example, deriving from Shinto religion came the most sacred notion that the
emperor was a living descendent from the sun goddess Amaterasu, the creator of Japan. This
conception was rationalized by the fact that the sun rose first everyday over Japan, while kokutai
orthodoxies politically aligned the emperor and his subjects to ensure unwavering devotion and
loyalty to the emperor system. 2
As the Meiji oligarchs continued to indoctrinate Japan in the ideologies of the emperor
system, the national ‘mission’ was conceived that saw an East Asia united under the emperor.
The oligarchs then expanded their horizon to try and include their Asian neighbors. They
believed that China and Korea should follow Japan’s example in becoming a modernized nation
and that the emperor should be the one to lead Japan’s neighbors towards modernity. Naturally
the Chinese and Koreans rebuffed this notion that would encourage Japan to scheme in order
carry out its national ‘mission’. This would result in the first Sino-Japanese conflict lasting from
1894 to 1895 in which Japan would win rights to Korean territories. This military victory
impressed the Western nations who all believed China would be victorious as they were bigger
in size and resources. To Japan, the war symbolized the authenticity of the emperor system and
the values of kokutai.3 Japan suddenly became the single most powerful East Asian nation,
replacing China, and the United States and Britain eagerly welcomed Japan onto the world stage.

Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1985), 4.
3
Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 135.
2
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In my second chapter, I will focus on how imperial orthodoxies were legitimized by the
state and understood by the public. Driven by the belief that Korea’s independence needed to be
protected, Japan’s second victory, against Russia, in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) proved
that Japan’s first victory against China was not a fluke, restored Japanese rights to the Liaotung
peninsula (won by Japan in their war with China) and signified that Japan had become an
authentic global power. Japan was sent into a war frenzy that swept across the nation. The mass
public became completely absorbed with their nation’s affairs and eagerly awaited their
newspapers’ publications. The written press found huge success in editorials regarding Japan’s
progress abroad and turned Japan’s expansionist desires a national affair. Newspapers selectively
highlighted the patriotism of Japanese soldiers while omitting information pertaining to Japan’s
military losses and in this way promoted imperial culture as they held significant control over
public knowledge. Imperialism was becoming a popular national crusade.
The annexation of Korea in 1910, followed by the Chinese Republican Revolution of
1911 and then outbreak of World War I (1914-1918), led Japan to conclude that it deserved, now
more than ever, to ‘enlighten’ its Asian neighbors and instill a Japanese ‘sphere’ of influence. By
the start of the Taishō Period in 1912, Japan had already expanded its territories to include the
Korean peninsula and the southern hemisphere of Manchuria; World War I also provided
opportunity for Japan to commandeer German colonized territories in China. In the wake of this
success, Japan would experience an economic depression through the 1920s, which would halt
expansion operations in Manchuria and cast Japan’s imperial future into the waters of
uncertainty. Politicians were more concerned with staying in office than addressing the
anxiousness of the public and for the first time since its conception, the national values that
embodied the kokutai were cast in doubt.

7
To replace faith in the emperor system, the Imperial Army became a crucial figure of
authority in restoring the Japanese national polity through the economic stagnation until 1945
when Japan lost in the Pacific War. One plan to quickly rejuvenate tennōsei ideologies entailed
right-wing conservatists focusing their attention on reinstituting education on emperor worship in
schools, to stress the emperor's divinity and to preserve the development of pure kokutai values
in children; conversely Japan set out to silence liberalist thought. But it was the Imperial Army
and its schemes in China that revitalized the public’s enthusiasm for war and support for Japan’s
national destiny, to ‘enlighten’ East Asia under the emperor. Through the years 1930 to 1945, the
Imperial Army would considered itself to be a great successful force, accumulating most of its
power and influence during this decade and a half; the public would once again become absorbed
into a war frenzy, when the Imperial Army invaded further into Manchuria in 1931, and revere
the emperor.
Both the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the China Incident in 1937 indicated to the
Western world that Japan’s conquest to imperialize the East was escalating at an alarming rate.
Due to the complexity of international politics, no nation could legally intervene in Japan’s
savagery in Asia, even though the Chinese had pleaded for assistance. By 1940, Japan had
concocted a new plan called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that declared
cooperation among the nations in East Asia. Ultimately this plan aimed to favor Japanese
imperialism and instill emperor worship across the continent, but ended unsuccessfully when
regions like French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies bluntly rebuffed Japan.
In the third chapter, I analyze how the emperor system influenced Japan’s aggressive
expansionist agenda towards the end of the Pacific War and then explore how emperor ideology
negatively impacted the lives of the nation in a post war society. On August 15, 1945, Emperor

8
Hirohito formally announced over the radio, to his subjects, that Japan had accepted the terms
of surrender issued at the Potsdam Conference on July 26; Japan had lost the war and the
imperial mission of creating a ‘Pan-Asia’ was permanently abandoned. This surrender occurred
only after the United States had dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, and
Nagasaki on August). The severity to which the Imperial Army enforced national polity defied
any sort of peaceful rationale so much so that when American forces landed in Okinawa,
“Japanese army forces...made it clear to all that the defense of the homeland would be
bloody...civilians were forced to commit mass suicide rather than surrender to the
[Americans].”4 The Pacific War brought about the end of explicit imperial power in the
Japanese Empire; the mythical elements of godliness, the essence of the emperor system and
Japanese national pride, were stripped away; Japan was forced into a sudden new reality that
their emperor was not a living god, they were not his extensions and that Japan no longer
functioned as a single entity revolving around the emperor; Japan was no longer the land of the
gods. But in the wake of this devastation arose a new Japan determined to understand and
reciprocate Western modernity in order to rebuild itself and be a ‘civilized’ nation again.

4

Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 135
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Chapter One: Imperial Restoration
You, whose ancestors in mighty days
Roared at the skies and swept across the earth
Stand now helpless to drive off the wrangling foreigners-How empty your title, “Queller of the Barbarians”
Yanagawa Seigan5

With the arrival of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry at Uraga Bay on July 8, 1853,
Japan was suddenly forced to open itself to the Western world after maintaining two and a half
centuries of relative isolation. Within the next two years foreign forms of modernity belonging to
the United States crept through Japan giving incentive for change within Japan's own political
state of being. The founding fathers of Meiji Japan, the samurai who led the overthrow of the
shogunate, envisioned a bright, successful future for their empire in which Japan would be the
superior Civilization. "On 3 January, 1868, a handful of ambitious samurai from han (feudal
domains) in southwest Japan carried out a bold coup d'etat by seizing control of the Imperial
Palace in the ancient capital of Kyoto. With the backing of some sympathetic court nobles and
samurai from a few other han, they ousted the Bakufu (the regime headed by a Shogun from the
Tokugawa) and proclaimed the restoration of power to the imperial dynasty."6 The vision that the
Meiji oligarchs held would serve to fuel Japan's unyielding successes that came to profoundly
affect the course of global history, as well as Japanese history. The Meiji oligarchs were
comprised of men from the different social classes established by the Tokugawa Bakufu and all

5
6

Peter Duus, Modern Japan, Second Edition ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 70-71.
Richard Sims, Japanese Political History since the Meiji Renovation: 1868-2000 (London: Hurst, 2001), 1-2.
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of whom desired political change for Japan, "…only two domains were capable of providing a
direct political and military threat to [the] Tokugawa hegemony,"7 that were the Satsuma and
Chōshū domains. At the very core of the oligarchs were Saigō Takamori and Ōkubo Toshimichi,
two samurai who hailed from Satsuma and "dominated Satsuma policy and thought."8 From
Chōshū were Kido Takayoshi, said to be the "soul of the Restoration"; Inoue Kaoru who took
part in the drafting of the Meiji Constitution of 1889; Itō Hirobumi, the founding father of
modern Japan; and Yamagata Aritomo, father of modern Japanese militarism. 9 As the
overthrowing of the Bakufu took place, more influential statesmen became a part of the new
ruling class. The Meiji oligarchs did not simply want to alter Japan to mirror the West in certain
aspects; they had extreme plans to completely reinvent Japan by absorbing Western cultural and
political systems. It was Itō Hirobumi who came to the conclusion that Japan could be united
through the institution of a national religion based on his analysis of Western nations and
Yamagata Aritomo who led the reformation in the Japanese army because he "had returned from
a tour of Europe convinced that the military systems in France and Prussia served to educate and
mobilize the population behind the government."10 Through careful observations of Western
culture and politics the Meiji oligarchs synthesized their objectives to create a modern Japanese
nation state that utilized a political system that revolved around emperor centered nationalism. In
this chapter, I will explore the discourses surrounding Japan's transition from the early modern
Tokugawa (Edo) period into a modern nation state and a formidable empire that came to be
regarded by the Western powers as a legitimate global power. I will argue in this chapter that the

7

Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, Japan in Transition, from Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 190.
8
Ibid., 190
9
George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967) 6-14.
10
Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge (MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2000) 21. And, Duus, Modern Japan, 90-91
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birth of Japanese nationalism could have only occurred as a by-product of Japan's thirst for
knowledge of the Western world.
To understand the drastic political reformation that took place in the Meiji period (18681912) following the Imperial Restoration, I will first discuss the changes that concluded the Edo
period and gave birth to Meiji. The Edo period lasted between the years 1603 and 1868 and is
known for its long period of relative stability in the realms of society and economics; it was the
last era to maintain a feudalistic military government system, which was centered on the
Tokugawa shogunate; the monarchy was viewed as peripheral in comparison. That is to say, the
Edo period lacked a strong sense of national identity among the Japanese subjects; "the emperor
existed alongside the shogunate, but there was no association to the emperor as a central symbol
for national identity."11 During the Tokugawa period, the state was upheld by firm authoritative
direction from the shogunate. When Commodore Perry and his fleet of black ships hovered
unauthorized in Uraga bay in 1853 "demanding the right to put up and trade at Japanese ports
[and] be taken to the emperor,"12 the shogunate was at a loss as to how to handle his uninvited
intrusion so much so that the shogunate consulted the monarchy for advice on a course of action.
To the Japanese subjects who placed their loyalty in the shogun's social system, this
exchange with the emperor was viewed as a sign of the shogun's weakness. "The bakufu had
adopted a policy…that probably saved Japan from a clash with foreign gunboats…at the
tremendous cost to its authority and legitimacy."13 As a consequence a popular slogan emerged
that acted as propaganda to rally the common people of Japan together. Sonnō Jōi that translates
to "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians," became an influential social movement that

11

Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996), 13.
12
Ian Buruma, Inventing Japan, 1853-1964 (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 12.
13
Duus, Modern Japan, 71.
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aimed to redirect the people's loyalty back to the Imperial Court and away from the Shogun. The
loudest voices of support for this political change came from former samurai who would later
become the Meiji oligarchs and increasingly came to resent the caste-based system established
by the shogunate.
The Tokugawa shogunate had established a caste-based social hierarchy that in turn
created a strong sense of unity within each social class. There were four class systems that
composed the Edo society: samurai (shì), farmers (nō), artisans (kō), and merchants (shō).
Dividing society into a caste-based system created an ethos of solidarity among the classes.
Subjects of the same class understood and could sympathize with each other, but were unable to
evoke a sense of common ground with another class. Tokugawa Society heavily relied on the
notion that each class would fulfill their designated role dutifully. Thus, when the Americans
inserted themselves without welcome into Japan and the slogan Sonnō Jōi began to spread;
Japanese subjects from all classes were able to collectively agitate for change. "The actual
overthrow of the Tokugawa Bakufu was not achieved by terrorist tactics but was carried out by
those samurai, primarily in Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa (another south-western han) who were
able to mobilize the full force of their domains behind their campaign."14
The historian Sakamoto Takao claims that one should view the Meiji Restoration and the
political changes it brought not as a revolution and discontinuity but as a competition and
unification with the West.15 In retrospect, the Meiji period was robust because it concentrated
social and political full attention onto the emperor as a symbol of Japan and in turn gave a
unified identity to its citizens. The Tokugawa shogunate, on the other hand, failed to "create a

14
15

Sims, Japanese Political History, 9.
Kevin M. Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan Placing the People (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 23.
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single, demarcated, centralized political authority."16 Takashi Fujitani argues that during the
Tokugawa period "the official discourse on ruling stressed that both society and polity were to be
maintained by the accentuation of social, cultural, and political sameness,"17 but by contrast, the
Meiji government aimed to undo the social order of two and a half centuries worth that the
Tokugawa era had established. Kano Masanao remarks on how the "discovery of the West also
produced the discovery of Japan."18Sims describes this crucial turn to be "[with] major political
and social changes came a policy of 'civilization and enlightenment' that encouraged the study of
the West and involved the introduction of Western-style institutions and systems."19
Itō Yahiko describes the arrival of Commodore Perry as "a liquefying phenomenon that
dissolved the pre-existing political world and provided an opening to the populist activist."20
The Japan of the Tokugawa era lacked a concrete national ethos and there was no sense of a
shared identity as a national whole; there existed no innate sense of being that identified as a
community distinct from the rest of the world. Tanaka Akira observes the arrival of Commodore
Perry as "encouraging Japanese people to begin to think of themselves as a united nation rather
than as members of diverse regions."21 Prior to 1853, 'Japan' as a modern nation simply did not
exist. After the United States came banging on the closed doors of Japan, the Meiji oligarchs
worked to develop a sense of a cultural distinctiveness, and an awareness to being specifically
"Japanese" was indoctrinated into the citizen subjects of the mid-19th century. The founding
fathers of the Meiji Restoration believed it was their civil obligation and moral "responsibility to

16

Doak, A History of Nationalism, 36.
Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 5.
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Doak, A History of Nationalism, 40.
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Sims, Japanese Political History, 2.
20
Doak, A History of Nationalism, 33.
21
Akira Tanaka, Bakumatsu ishinshi no kenkyu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkanm 1996) 236-258.
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lead Japan out of the wilderness of backwardness and weakness toward the green pastures of
civilization and power."22
With the transition into the Meiji period, the idea of "imperial restoration" acted as
enthusiastic propaganda that encouraged commoners to embrace the new direction that the Meiji
oligarchs wished to guide Japan. By inventing, manipulating and rewriting the foundation of the
essence of "Japaneseness," the Meiji oligarchs created new feelings of national unity amongst the
citizens. But the early years of change in the Meiji Restoration was met with resistance from the
common people whose lives were supposed to benefit from this political change. The Meiji
oligarchs understood this instability to be caused by a lack of a central national image. Fujitani
remarks on an instance in 1876 in Mie Prefecture when local citizens attacked the central
government because their lives had not changed since the Meiji Restoration. "The representatives
of the state attacked [the citizens'] religion and way of life, by compulsory education that was
costly in terms of tuition and children's labor lost, by military conscription, and by even heavier
taxation than experienced in the past."23 The idea behind the imperial restoration was to instill
hope for change that would benefit the citizens. Thus it was crucial for the success of the
Restoration to have a solid social structure to guide Japan towards a new modern civilization.
The Meiji oligarchs invented a system based around emperor-centered nationalism that
endeavored to re-educate the nation to believe that the Emperor was the central entity of Japan
and that all of Japan was to be ruled at his behest. Japan was re-cast as "the land of the gods,
inhabited by a people uniquely superior in the world, who lived together, the whole national as a
single family, under the benevolent guidance of the divine emperor."24

22

Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 60.
Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 7.
24
Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1985), 4.
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In the Meiji Constitution of 1890, it is written that the Emperor shall be the symbol of the
State and of the unity of the people. Meiji oligarch and founding father of the Meiji Constitution
Itō Hirōbumi warned, "If the constitution is known to the people as having been drafted by a
given individual, it will lose the people's respect. It may [even] come to be said that it would be
better not to have a constitution than to have a constitution disrespected by the people."25 Before
promulgating the Meiji Constitution to solidify the Emperor's symbolism and in turn the
legitimacy Meiji oligarchy, the oligarchs sought to remold Japan so that encounters with new
ideologies in everyday life resonated with sincere loyalty; citizens' hearts and minds should
become one. The solidarity that quickly amalgamated Japan is one of many impressive
accomplishments achieved by the Meiji oligarchs, who sought means of validating their political
legitimacy.
In his introduction on the manufacture of tradition Fujitani briefly discusses how the
Meiji oligarchs relied heavily on the "fabrication" of culture to legitimize the state. The
oligarchs' first order of business in the early stages of modern Japan was to figure out ways for
the common people to identity their Japanese 'cultural' roots that in turn pave the way to a strong
national ethos. In short, the Meiji oligarchs wanted to utilize invented 'culture' to manipulate the
commoners to believe in the new social construct identity of being a citizen. The oligarchs in
their journeys abroad to Europe had interpreted religion to be prominent in Western styled
ceremonies that was then understood as forging a strong unification between the people and the
state. Japan did not have any primary sources that could serve as a core guidance for the
oligarchs; there were no primary texts from which an ideology could be built from or
proselytized to the nation. As such the Meiji oligarchs attempted to apply nationalistic values to
previously ordinary entities in an effort to integrate the cultural essence of Japan into the daily
25

Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government, 61.
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lives of Japanese citizens. "Since the Meiji Restoration, ritual making has been a central concern
of the Japan's governing elites [who] invented, revived, manipulated, and encouraged national
rituals [in order to] bring this [new] territory…under one ruler, one legitimating sacred order, and
one dominant memory."26 For example to reinforce the sacred origin narrative that the Emperor
was a descendant of the sun-goddess Amaterasu; not only did it become a custom in school for
children to bow to the east toward the Emperor before beginning work, but also the promulgation
of the Meiji Constitution of February 11, 1889, was planned in conjunction with the same date as
the ascension of the first Emperor of Japan, Jimmu, and became the first national holiday.27 The
Meiji oligarchs planned to accelerate Japan in the modern world that the Western nations had
already broken through.
"By the time of the Restoration Japan possessed a core of "experts," their knowledge
based in some cases no more than a single visit to Europe or America, but in others reflecting
years of study."28 The Meiji period represented a new dawn for Japan, with the name Meiji itself
meaning a bright, or enlightened, reign, a slowly approaching enlightenment delivered by those
who had worked together to overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate; "a loosely-held body of jealous
and proud individuals, each with his specific ideas on how best to achieve the goal of a strong
and independent Japan."29 But Japan's growing obsession with the Western world flitted between
attraction and repulsion as the Meiji leaders grappled with feelings of inferiority vis-a-vis
dependence on the West for guidance; Japan interpreted the continuing progression of modernity
in the Western nations to be a race in which Japan was being left behind. Hence it became
essential for Japan to quickly close the contemporary political gap between herself and the

26

Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 11.
Ibid., 12.
28
W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972), 306.
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Western nations, but to also rectify the unequal treaties forced upon the nation by the United
States and Britain. "National unity, on which defense in the face of foreign threat depended,
required political change; that this in some sense gave a new role to the Imperial Court; and that
there must be a willingness to 'use barbarian to control barbarian' that is to adopt Western
technique in the service of military and economic strength.”30
In preparation for and during the early stages of modernizing Japan, the newly
established Meiji government sought guidance from their ally, the newly Prussian-orientated
Germany. "Earlier the Japanese had looked to the United States, but very little of use had come
from that country…restoration leaders were not favorably impressed [with] England and
Ireland."31 A new trajectory was taken to build up a formidable military as a means to progress a
step further towards a superior Civilization; with the reformation of Japan, the Meiji oligarchs
maintained a vision to mold the empire into a specific type of Civilization that would not only be
on par with the Western nations like America and Germany, but the oligarchs would not be
satisfied until their vision surpassed the West entirely. Peter Duus elaborates further on this form
of 'enlightenment' in which he acutely summarizes Japan's view on the world. "The dynamic
countries of the West represented 'civilization,' the most advanced stage of human development,
while China, India, and pre-Restoration Japan were 'semi-civilized' and the rest of the world was
'savage' or 'barbarian'."32
The ambitious dream to become like Western nations with the intentions to surpass them
would have been impossible to even fathom without the crucial assistance of Germany. "After
the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, when the inadequate training of the army became evident…Japan

30

Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, 302.
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gradually turned toward Germany and away from Great Britain, the United States and France in
its search for appropriate western prototype to emulate."33 Emulation would be the key strategy
to reinvent Japan for the Meiji oligarchs would appropriate Western military and legislation and
transform it to be Japanese so to keep their national polity 'pure'; a crucial incorporation to the
Japanese empire would be a Prussian influenced constitution in 1889, twenty one years after the
inauguration of the Japanese nation state. "The Japanese regarded the young, aspiring Imperial
German Reich as the model of an orderly nation state with a patriotic folk loyal to its
monarch."34 In this ideology, a constitution represented more than a set of rules, it was the living
soul of the state.
The Meiji oligarchs rationalized the necessity of developing a constitution as not only a
means to protect Japan from foreign invasion, but also to rectify blatant unequal treaties imposed
on the empire by Western powers like the United States and Great Britain, in which rules were
created in Western favor. "Based on the Prussian constitution, [the Japanese constitution] was
meant to impress the Western world that Japan was now a modern nation-state, which should be
free at last of unequal treaties that still afforded Americans and Europeans special privileges."35
For example, the Japan-US Treaty of Peace and Amity in 1854 forced Japan to accept American
ships at undesignated ports and on the mainland as well as receive any and all Americans
graciously. In addition to restoring full international sovereignty to Japan, the constitution
represents a form of centralization by bringing unity between the Japanese government and its
citizens; it would come to legitimize Meiji ideologies by clearly outlining the duties of the
Emperor, his subjects and the government. That is to say, the constitution exemplified a strong
national ethos and inspired Japanese citizens to embrace a new modernity.
Martin, and Wetzler, “The German Role in the Modernization of Japan,” 78.
Ibid., 78.
35
Buruma, Inventing Japan, 37.
33
34
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Doak writes on the Meiji Constitution that the primary function was twofold: to
[politically] unite the [Japanese subjects] under sovereign monarchy and to take away dieresis
and make the [nation] all the same36; this was in essence the beginning of what would become a
very powerful ideology known as the tennōsei ideology (Emperor System). Without the emperor,
the entire Meiji Restoration would have been unsuccessful. "The Emperor [was] a symbol, not a
ruler…and was important to the restoration leaders because he could give them legitimacy."37 I
will comment briefly below on the Meiji government's objective to build up the emperor's image
amongst the Japanese subjects and the role of the emperor within the development of the Meiji
constitution.
The emperor's image was a crucial competent to the Meiji restoration; the former samurai
who took control of Japan and ended the shogunate rule envisioned a dominant future for Japan;
and needed to sustain a permanent authoritative hold over Japan. The Meiji oligarchs had no
intention of giving real power to the emperor, but publicized the illusion that the changes being
made were done so by the emperor; it would be impossible to convince a nation to devote their
loyalty to any other form of sovereignty but the emperor. Before the promulgation of the Meiji
constitution on February 11, 1889, the oligarchs dedicated an abundance of time to promoting
the emperor's image across all of Japan so that when the constitution was delivered to the public
there would be less incentive to protest the new government system. Fujitani details how "the
Meiji government sent out senkyōshi (state propaganda) and kyōdoshōku (national priests) to the
farther corners of Japan to inspire people to embrace the new Emperor system. In schools, too,
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the emperor's portrait had become an object of worship."38 But there was than merely using the
emperor's image as propaganda to gain support for the new state regime.
Fukuzawa Yukichi, a journalist of the Meiji era, astutely sums up the role of the emperor
in relation to the aim of modern Civilization as such, "School, industries, armies, and navies are
all the mere external forms of civilization. They are not difficult to produce…yet there remains
something immaterial, something that cannot be seen or heard, bought or sold, lent or borrowed
that pervades the whole nation and whose influence is so strong that without it none of
the…external forms [of civilization] would be the slightest use. This supremely important thing
is…the spirit of civilization."39 It was not the emperor himself who was the 'spirit of civilization',
but his image manipulated and engineered by the Meiji oligarchs that inspired a nationwide
social and cultural revolution. The oligarchs understood the necessity of embellishing the role of
the emperor in their mission to create a constitution that would commandeer every life in Japan;
the constitution would provide a strict conception of citizenship in Meiji so that it would no
longer be satisfactory to just be born in Japan, people (citizens) must have a sound sense of
nation.40 The Meiji period reflected Japan's determination to join the Western nations in the
world of modernity; the oligarchs drafted a new definition of 'Japanese' internally and externally
within its first constitution.
The Meiji constitution was drafted with two very important objectives in mind: a model
designed to be a powerful modern state based off of Europe's experiences and a constitution that
shared some power and responsibility with other officials whom the Meiji oligarchs felt did not
deserve.41 It was written by five men; Ito Hirobumi, Inoue Kowashi, Ito Miyoji, Kaneko Kentaro
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and Carl Friedrich Hermann Roesler, a "German expert on constitutional law…the only foreigner
who was called upon personally to advise the government on constitutional matters."42 In fact if
Roesler had been successful in his advising to Itō Hirobumi, the constitution would have taken a
completely different direction and been more democratically oriented. The first draft of the
constitution was rejected as a mere reflection of European nations constitutions that failed to
embody Japan's national polity.43 For Japan never intended to become Westernized, all culture
and traditions appropriated were to still maintain a pure Japanese essence; "the Meiji
Constitution between western legal provisions and traditional Japanese content was invested in it
from the very beginning."44

The Promulgation of the Meiji Constitution

The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.
The Constitution of the Empire of Japan (1889)
Chapter I Article III
To ensure the cleverly designed illusion that portrayed all of Japan to be descended from
the gods could never be disturbed as well as strengthen their new emperor system, Itō Hirobumi
made certain that during the drafting of the preamble and even first chapter the constitution
explicitly referenced the sacredness of the imperial monarchy and by extension the rest of Japan.
The constitution not only represented a primary source of legitimacy for the Meiji oligarchs and
their constitutional government, but also firmly fixed the tennōsei ideology into place which
would go on to sustain Japan’s ambition of uniting all of East Asia and then the West under the
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sovereignty of the emperor (to be discussed in depth in Chapter 2). The promulgation of the
constitution served as Japan’s first modern national ceremony.
Monday, February 11, 1889, the sacred date of the promulgation of the Meiji
constitution. “The ceremonies took place in sacred and national time, on kigensetsu, the holiday
created in 1873 to commemorate the accession of the first emperor, Jimmu, and hence the
founding of the nation.”45 All of the hard work the Meiji oligarchs had done to prepare Japan to
embrace the new conception of national identity as being Japanese and to adapt to the changes
Western modernity brought was put on full display in the imperial palace. Dressed in
“ceremonial vestments of his ancestors” the emperor stood in the Palace Sanctuary, the
innermost place and strictly forbidden to be entered by anyone but the rites performers.46 There
the emperor would announce to his imperial ancestors on the new changes wrought forth by the
Meiji oligarchs and new modernity Japan would be striving towards. The new political system
was described as “[a] progressive tendency of the course of human affairs and in parallel with the
advance of civilization.”47 Following the emperor’s oath, imperial messengers were sent out to
relay the news to the divine gods at Ise Shrine and to the graves of the two previous emperors.
By doing these two separate actions, the ideology of the emperor’s sacredness was set in the
people’s minds for decades to come. “In the throne room the emperor handed down the
Constitution, his gesture symbolizing the kintei kenpō, a Constitution bestowed upon the nation
as a gracious imperial gift.”48
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The Makings of the Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895
The attack on China opens a new epoch in our history, it moves us from the national stage to the
world stage. Our Great Japan now becomes tied to the world, militarily, commercially, and
politically--In our national actions, in our personal actions, in the material sphere, and the
spiritual sphere.
Kokumin Shimbun, December 5, 1894;
Quoted in Nishida Taketoshi, Meiji jidai no shimbun to zasshi.49
Following the post-Restoration years, the Meiji oligarchs were presented with conflicting
choices that could potentially prove disastrous for Japan. On one hand, the Meiji oligarchs
wanted to restore full sovereignty to Japan by undoing the unequal treaties the shogunate had
reluctantly signed with the United States and Britain; let it not be forgotten that the Meiji
oligarchs were once samurai who held severe disdain for foreign presence on Japanese soil and
was then perceived as a complete humiliation for Japan. On the other hand, the Meiji oligarchs
were acutely aware that Japan was not yet capable of challenging Western military; even with
Yamagata Aritomo’s direction to completely rebuild the Japanese military structure to reflect a
more German orientation. But there was an undoubted consensus within the Meiji government
that “urged decisive action, even military action, to restore the ‘national honor’ forfeited by the
bakufu in its concessions to the foreigners.”50
Restoring “national honor” to Japan was not as simple a task as the Meiji oligarchs
presumed it would be. Adopting a Westernized legislation system and appropriating Western
culture across the nation merely meant that Japan was to be the first East Asian nation to conquer
the ‘challenges’ of modernity (in the eyes of the West). “The Iwakura mission [of] 1871 departed
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for the West with hopes of opening negotiations for treaty revision.”51 Duus describes the
Iwakura mission to be an ultimate failure as the Japanese were not only unable to renegotiate the
terms of the treaty, but also it became clear to the Meiji oligarchs that the United States and other
Western powers involved with Japan would not easily acquiesce any arrangements that could
shift the balance in political power in Eastern favor. Along with the Western sphere, the Meiji
oligarchs also wanted to assert Japan’s newfound superiority of being a modern nation and
promote Western modernity to the Eastern sphere too; specifically to the Middle Kingdom and
Korea. I will comment briefly below on the dynamics of East Asia up until 1894 in order to
discuss the events that led up to the first war for the modernized Japan.
Before the United States had appeared at Japan’s front doors in 1853, the Western power
had already established its presence in China some twenty years earlier. “Europeans and
Americans have always been ready to believe that trade with China [held] potential for profit.”52
Great Britain and the United States had first enacted unequal treaties with China in order to gain
access to ports to further opportunities for commercial trade. Beasley describes the
circumstances in which the Western power was able to create such a treaty as requiring three
conditions: the first, the Western power had to ensure to their merchants all potential access to
trading in East Asia; the second, the Western power had to ensure some level of protection for
foreign merchants; the third condition needing to be met was that the Western power had to be
ready to use force in order to see through the first two conditions were being upheld by the East
Asian nation in question.
That is to say, for instance, the imposed Treaty of Nanking (1842) which was the
conclusion to the Opium War of 1840 (a war fought for foreign commercial privilege) between
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Britain and China, forcibly opened five ports to British trade while also placing Hong Kong
entirely under British control. Furthermore foreigners were afforded privileges such as lower
custom duties and the freedom to live how they pleased without fear of Chinese discrimination
while the Chinese were not granted the same rights for overseas. “To many in contemporary
Britain, freedom of trade and freedom for traders were so axiomatic as to justify the use of force
to secure a more liberal entry to the Chinese market.”53 This new treaty port system would come
to influence a new type of relationship of superiority that the Japanese would use in order to
further their expansionist objectives across Asia.
The consensus in Japan on China was juxtaposed, divided into admiration and contempt.
“On the one hand, most educated Japanese found it hard to think ill of a country that had
provided the foundations of their own writing system, numerous administrative structures...many
of their aesthetic norms...on the other hand, the Japanese had watched with increasing contempt
as China struggled unsuccessfully to meet the challenges of modernity and Western
imperialism.”54 Tensions were strung high in Japan at the relationship between Korea and China;
the Meiji government resented the fact that Korea remained loyal to China’s influences and
continuously rebuffed Japan’s diplomatic era. From the Korean standpoint “many Korean
scholars and officials regarded the Japanese as ‘Oriental renegades’ who had betrayed their
heritage by shamelessly imitating Western countries.”55 “A ‘war party’ emerged in Japan,
insisting that the continuing rebuffs from the Korean court must be dealt with by a punitive
expedition.”56 Exactly like the United States had applied gunboat tactics to force Japan to open
its ports, the Meiji government set out to open Korea under the system of a port treaty.
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Japan’s resolve resulted in the treaty of Kanghwa enacted February 26, 1876. The
contents of this treaty can be understood in hindsight to have set in motion the inevitable clash
between Japan and China. “It opened three Korean ports to trade; gave permission for the
continuation of coastal surveys; and described Korea as an independent state, enjoying ‘the same
sovereign rights as does Japan.’”57 In reality though, Japan did not intend to actually allow Korea
to be ‘independent’ as the Meiji government wanted to establish Japanese influence within Korea
and “rid Korea of China’s ‘paternal influence’ in order to strengthen Japan’s own standing the
broader imperialistic world.”58 The provisions of the Kanghwa treaty, in particular enjoying the
‘same sovereign rights as Japan’ provoked an ethnic rivalry between Japan and China to see
which nation could be superior within Korea.
The treaty of Kanghwa represented the Meiji oligarchs first authentic step towards an
affirmative action for foreign policy, at the behest of critics to the new government. In the past,
during the Tokugawa reign, the shogunate had tried to establish a diplomatic relationship with
Korea, but were unsuccessful. Liberals of Meiji Japan argued that “Japan’s new national strength
brought with it a responsibility to help its neighbors ‘civilize’ themselves.”59 While Fukuzawa
also firmly believed that China and Korea needed to be protected from Western powers and that
it was Japanese obligation to protect oriental culture while simultaneously promoting Western
civilization. Activists in Japan feared that the West would dominate over Asia which in turn
would directly hinder Japan’s national strength and threaten their national security. The Meiji
leaders were not far behind in coming to the same conclusion that Japan should be “concerned
about the fate of [their] neighboring countries,”60 as smaller Asian countries were succumbing to
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Western domination. The growing consensus then became that in the interest of protecting
Japan’s national security from further Western imperialism, Japan felt morally obligated to
dominate the rest of East Asia.
Yamagata Aritomo strongly believed in fortifying Japan’s independence by making it a
national interest to ‘protect’ adjacent territories in order to “maintain peace in the Orient.”61 The
Korean peninsula was perceived as ideal territory to help the Meiji oligarchs progress forward in
their quest to make a superior Japan. With the treaty of Kanghwa serving as legitimate cause to
‘encourage’ a Japanese-Korean relationship, the Japanese expansionist party saw this as an
opportunity to spread Japanese influence in Korea; more specifically Korea was seen as an ideal
nation to begin Japanese strategy to guide the East into modernization. Japanese-Chinese rivalry
flared as “promising young Korean [scholars] were sent to Japan to receive a modern
education.”62 Both the Chinese and opposed Koreans resented this blooming relation with Japan
resulting in Korea splitting into pro-Japanese and pro-Chinese factions.
The Meiji oligarchs would become even more aggressive in their political crusade in
Korea, especially as the Korean government continued to seek assistance from China which only
further agitated Japanese indignation. In Japan, the various newspapers such as Jiji Shinpō and
Niroku Shinpō rapidly brought attention to China’s military actions within Korea and the lack of
Japanese inclusion on Korean matters thus prompting public outcry at Korea’s blatant offence to
Japan; “When the reports of China’s troop dispatch reached Tokyo in early June, the leading
papers demanded an immediate, strong response.”63 Duus comments on the power balance of the
1880’s of East Asia and how the Japanese watched as China’s military was unable to adequately
handle foreign intrusion of the French in Indochina. “A backward and weak Korea under the
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control of an equally backward and weak China seemed easy prey for one of the Western
powers.”64 This fear grew sharply when Russia proposed to build a trans-Siberian railroad; the
Japanese leaders saw this industrial move to “put Korea at risk” and “threaten the independence
of Korea.”65
To protect Korean independence from Western encroachment was an entirely separate
matter than revolved around successful military operations against the Qing Dynasty. Explicitly
stated in the provisions of the Kanghwa treaty was that Korea be able to ‘enjoy the same
sovereign rights as Japan’ and be ‘an independent state’ which was written with the intentions
for solely Japan to ‘guide’ Korea towards modernization. Therefore the Meiji leaders decided
that Japan needed to intervene in the Korea-China relationship. “For the Japanese army, [they]
wished to free Korea from Chinese rule and [place] Korea firmly under Japanese political
domination.”66 The general agreement from both bodies of power was that in order for any
reformation to occur in Korea, China must be driven out. “Only if the Chinese were ousted
would it be possible for the Koreans to undertake the self-strengthening reforms needed to
guarantee a Korean independence.”67 July of 1894 “Japanese troops seized [Korea’s] royal
palace, forcing the king to sign an agreement authorizing the Japanese to expel the Chinese [from
Korea].”68 For Japan wanted to dominate Korea to progress their political ambition to unite all of
East Asia under Japanese sovereignty; this desire brought Japan into a quick war with China that
is known as the first Japanese-Sino War.
August 1, 1894, Japan declared war on China and emerged victorious little under a year
on April 1, 1895. Within the first two months of naval warfare against China, Japanese troops
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had seized almost all control of Korea; September 16, Japanese military captured Pyongyang, the
capital of Korea; September 17, Japanese established complete dominance over the Yellow Sea;
October 24, Port Arthur was safely secured under Japanese authority69; Mid-February, Japanese
fleet destroyed Chinese navy in Chinese waters.70 The war itself was a quick affair with
consistent Japanese success, but its significance in history was perceived on a monumental scale;
for both Japan and the world. In Japan the written press awoke a fiery patriotism within the
public. As newspapers increasingly reported Japanese victories against China, the public mood
began to shift towards a new found admiration and away from criticism of the new government
system.
August 1, 1894, Japan declared war on China and emerged victorious little under a year
on April 1, 1895 with Korea secured under Japanese control. Within the first two months of
naval warfare against China, Japanese troops had seized almost all control of Korea; September
16, Japanese military captured Pyongyang, the capital of Korea; September 17, Japanese
established complete dominance over the Yellow Sea; October 24, Port Arthur was safely
secured under Japanese authority71; Mid-February, Japanese fleet destroyed Chinese navy in
Chinese waters.72 The war itself was a quick affair with consistent Japanese success, but its
significance in history was perceived on a monumental scale; for both Japan and the world.
“Most foreign observers, including the Chinese themselves, were certain that the tiny Japanese
island kingdom was no match for the great Chinese empire.”73 Indeed the Japanese military was
considerably smaller than Chinese military, but the continuous triumphs over China’s army
symbolized the vast gap between of Western influence in Japan and China. In Japan the written
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press awoke a fiery patriotism within the public. As newspapers increasingly reported Japanese
victories against China, the public mood began to shift towards a new found admiration for Japan
on a nationalist’s level and away from criticism of the new political system. “Editors’
[committed] to providing [Japanese citizens] with every imaginable detail about the war effort,
both home and abroad.”74 Journalists paved the way towards a stronger relationship between the
Meiji leaders and the Japanese citizens in which the public felt they could place unwavering
loyalty into the new emperor-system. The year 1895 marked a new dawn in history as Japan
debuted itself to be not only a legitimate global power, but also the most singular powerful
nation state in East Asia.
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Chapter Two: Japan as a Global Power

Over the course of the next forty years, roughly from 1894 to 1945, Japan’s continuous
success on the world stage made the imperial nation a legitimate power in the eyes of other
established empires. The Meiji oligarchs had prepared Japan thoroughly to adapt to the necessary
changes that modernity brought, since the beginnings of the Meiji period. It would be a new
generation of men, who were produced by a Japan now educated in and inspired by Western
ideologies, who would go on to turn Japan into an imperialistic state, by the early twentieth
century. In setting out to ensure political dominance over their East Asian neighbors, these new
government leaders would see to it that Japan remained focused on its national ‘destiny’ to
harmonize the East under the emperor. The following period of Taishō (1912-1926) saw attempts
to spur a wave of democracy with the government splitting into separate political groups; one
side favored the clique government rule of the oligarchs, while the other side was comprised of
anti-bureaucratic men who wanted a more participatory government.75 By the time of the Taisho
emperor’s death on December 25, 1926, politics in Japan were in the process of shifting towards
the right-winged extremists; inspired by the Imperial Army who called for “national unity” and
desired to instill across Asia a more pure kokutai (Japan, and in extension the rest of Asia, should
be united under the emperor), on behalf of the emperor. The dedication of the Imperial Army
reignited absolute devotion to nation and emperor worship. The circulation of perpetual
victorious news evoked feelings of ultra-nationalism from the mass public. In this chapter I will
argue the crucial roles of the written press and the Imperial army and how their influence brought
the public to believe Japan's national mission of creating a Pan Asia was a righteous cause.
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The Rise of the Press and War Propaganda

When the vastly smaller Japanese Empire defeated the mighty Chinese dynasty (SinoJapanese war 1894-1895) in their own domain, winning dominance over the Korean peninsula,
the existing balance of power shifted and Japan emerged as the single most powerful nation in
East Asia at the end of the nineteenth century. America and Great Britain welcomed Japan onto
the world stage as a modernized nation, but other European powers like Russia, France and
Germany hesitated to view this dramatic change with a favorable attitude due to their
investments already established in China; Japan's newfound authority threatened to destabilize
European economic, industrial and territorial acquired benefits. In May 1895, Russia, supported
by France and Germany, pressured Japan into returning the Liaodong Peninsula (Port Arthur) to
China in order to further their own industrial expansion of trans-railway systems which would
provide easy travel between Russia and China.76 On the home front in Japan, the public's primary
source of information, about their nation's progress abroad, came from newspapers and
magazines. The lack direct communication between the Meiji government and Japanese citizens
gave rise to a new voice of the press, one that spoke on behalf of the new imperial Japan; the
news media developed a strong sense of self-importance and took it upon themselves to nurture
deep rooted nationalistic pride within the public.77
Since the start of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894, the rise of high circulation news
media spread across Japan as war reports of Japan’s success were delivered regularly to every
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citizen. The Meiji oligarchs revealed very little of their affairs to the public once they had
established their new regime; instead their focus in communication with the public was placed on
creating model citizens through use of the emperor system.78 Japan’s first modern war, with
China, opened a door for print media which evolved rapidly during the Meiji period from “a tool
of the authorities into an independent medium of public discussion...out of the rumblings of
internal strife...came the stirrings of civil society”79 A war fever erupted and sparked a rivalry
among newspapers to see who could deliver news to the public fastest. When war with Russia
broke out in 1905 on the Korea-Manchuria border, frequent updates of reports from the
battlefield built up extreme enthusiasm from the public and in turn all of Japan became immersed
in the oligarch’s imperial jingoism.
The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 solidified a newly modern sense of nationalism,
uniting the public and influencing them to put wholehearted faith into the new ideologies of
emperor worship that the Meiji oligarchs created. Prior victory in China demonstrated to the
public that “the emperor was not only a constitutional monarch but the country’s paramount
military leader.”80 In this way, war became a national affair as the mass media broadcasted select
information and new, usually articles that highlighted Japan’s triumphs. In early 1905, the
Japanese Army expressed great concern to its government over the amount of casualties that
were sacrificed in order to secure victories against Russia; 56,000 casualties occurred to win
back Port Arthur; by the end of the year long war, Japan had mobilized around 1.1 million men
and lost a total of 118,000 men.81 Huffman comments on the one-sided nature the mass media
had towards broadcasting information; newspapers actively chose to stay silent about Japan’s
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losses and ignored the crimes committed in Korea by the Japanese army. Huffman also discusses
the reality of Japanese casualties which the Meiji officials and the press ambiguously informed
the public.82 “For those at home the [Russo-Japanese War] consisted solely of a string of
costly...smashing and exhilarating victories, glorious confirmation that the more modest triumphs
of the earlier war with China were not a fluke...Japan had become a power worthy of the name
imperialist.”83 This kind of expectancy of success would leave Japan unprepared to handle news
of total devastating defeat nearly forty years later, something I will go into depth later in this
chapter.
The mass media took on a newly active character with editorials increasingly oriented
around an acute conception of Japan’s “righteous” mission entailed nation centered beliefs that
“fostered unity.”84 Expansionist journalists pushed for Japan to engage in aggressive foreign
policies under the pretense of protecting the national interests of Japan. When Japan was on the
verge of war with Russia, newspaper headlines without official authorization spoke to the public
about Japan’s civic duty to go to war. By publishing “endless successions of emotional, patriotic
stories” concerning their nation’s “right to insist on massive Russian concession,” mass media
strongly influenced public opinion and in turn pressure was placed on Meiji officials to pursue
hasty warfare; victories over China and Russia signified to the public that the invented emperor
system was not only a legitimate political system, but also to support a culture of imperial
lifestyle.85
Newspapers therefore had complete control over public knowledge and as a result
orchestrated the development of nationalist organizations such as the prominent and popular
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Black Dragon Society (kokuryûkai) which declared its manifesto to be “The urgent duty of Japan
was to fight Russia...and then to lay the foundation for a grand continental enterprise taking
Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia as one region.”86 Duus observes the way both the SinoJapanese war and Russo-Japanese war promoted imperial culture and added a new perception to
being ‘Japanese’, “Being a child of the emperor involved more than paying taxes [and] obeying
the law.”87 Besides forming nationalist organizations, citizens found alternative ways to
participate in the war from home, which added to the image of Japanese imperialism.
“Communities subscribed to war bonds, villagers gathered food for troops...teachers taught their
pupils that Japan’s cause was ‘righteous,’ and [then] students marched off to local shrines to
pray.”88
The ‘cause of Japan’ transcended the social hierarchy and infiltrated all aspects of
domestic businesses. When word spread that Japan had defeated a modern power in Russia, not
only were celebrations thrown in the emperor’s honor, but consumer products increasingly
displayed Japan’s distinct national flag of the rising sun. Japanese citizens-having been
conditioned by the mass media-were overwhelmed with patriotic love for their country’s
victory.89 For example, for Ubukata Toshirō, a student who followed the newspaper, reading
about Japan’s triumph in one battle evoked feelings of “excitement”; “he felt warm and could no
longer sit calmly at home”; Ubukata went to go find his friends who also shared the same
passionate emotions after reading the newspaper.90 Another example recorded by Huffman was
of a man named Seizō who, on his deathbed in his village, would not let go of the newspaper and
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clutched it tightly to his chest.91 Duus states that by the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the
once commoners of Japan now turned dutiful citizens had become more imperialistic than the
Meiji oligarchs.92 This can be said due to how the mass media had successfully acquired loyal
readership from almost all of Japan; their audience ranged from ordinary citizens in secluded
villages to the elite leaders in the government. Lack of official communication from the Meiji
oligarchs regarding their hardships during both wars left the public vulnerable to biased
editorials from pro-expansionist journalists which naturally resulted in the public fully believing
in a skewed reality of Japan.
Being strongly influenced by newspaper pro-war propaganda, it was no wonder that the
public felt betrayed and outraged when the Meiji oligarchs were unable to consistently deliver
results. One incident in particular that caused riots was the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty in
which “Japan failed to secure greater concessions from the Russians.”93 Sydney Giffard, a
British diplomat, remarks that these violent attacks on authority figures in Tokyo represented the
public’s “resentment that sacrifices, not only in the war but also in the construction of the
modern state, [was] so inadequately rewarded.”94 This ‘failure’ was interpreted as a sign of
weakness that threatened to hinder Japan’s national “mission” which was to “protect the
‘backward’ nations of Asia and help them towards independence and self-government.”95 But
overall victory over both Russia and China undeniably meant to the citizens of Japan that their
clearly superior nation should be allowed to assume the position as leader in Asia as it had also
just won new colonial territories: Taiwan, southern Sakhalin, Korea, the Kwantung territories in
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China; and the South Manchuria Railway zone.96 To the rest of Asia, Japanese victory
specifically against Russia signified that Western nations were no longer invincible entities.

The Fight for the Korean Peninsula

If Manchuria becomes property of Russia, Korea itself cannot remain independent.
Foreign Minister
Komura Jutarō (1901)97

1905, the Portsmouth Treaty (mediated by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt) granted
Japan the formal right to ‘protect’ its interests in Korea; the peninsula was to become a product
of “enlightened exploitation” in other words as a Japanese protectorate.98 In other words, the rest
of the world officially recognized Korea as ‘belonging’ to Japan and any desire to engage in
foreign business would have to be authorized by imperial Japan. “According to international law,
without Japan, Korea no longer existed in relation to the rest of the world.”99 The newspapers
framed this outcome as a necessary action because Korea was a place of “backwardness,
corruption and [in] need for civilized leadership.”100 By 1907, Japan had assumed total control
over Korea’s judicial system with full intentions to use their sphere of influence to redesign the
Korean legal code. “According to the logic of colonization, Japan’s Korea could be declared
legal like Japan, a place the Powers could determine to be ‘civilized’.”101
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Liberating Korea from both China and Russia in order to ‘protect’ Korean independence
was all but a faded political statement said only to further the Meiji oligarchs’ own agenda for
Japan. The Ōsaka Asahi wrote: “The purpose for which a country has a colony is not for the
interests of the inhabitants of the colony but for the interest of the mother country.”102 For Japan,
Korea not only served as proof of legitimate political power on the world stage, but also
supplemented the carefully constructed ideology of tennōsei (the emperor system). The Meiji
oligarchs wished to establish an agricultural base, but their plan to send Japanese farmers to
Korea ended unsuccessfully. Instead, the lower middle class of Japan found great economic
prosperity and opportunities in migrating to the newly colonized territories. For example, in
resettling to other parts of Asia “jobs were created for policemen, mailmen, technicians, clerks,
as well as small commerce businesses.”103 More importantly, the Japanese emigrants were
introduced to living as a privileged class. “[The Japanese] enjoyed higher living standards,
higher wages, and better access to schools, hospitals, and other social amenities than the
indigenous population.”104
It came as no surprise that when Korea attempted to resist Japanese encroachment violent
repercussions ensued to ensure that imperial Japan remained in total control; there was to be
absolutely no compromise or cooperation to be exchanged with the nation state that supposedly
advocated for Korean independence. Sydney Giffard comments on how increasing Korean
resistance only fueled determination of officials in Tokyo who “considered the complete
subordination of Korea [as] an essential Japanese interest.”105 The Meiji oligarchs intended to
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turn “Koreans into full-fledged ‘children of the emperor’ through a policy of ‘assimilation’.”106
Koreans were then recast as people who had the “same origins and same ancestors” as the
Japanese and that because both nations seemingly also shared the same culture it was only
natural that Korea should become an extension of Japan’s kokutai (being ‘Japanese,’)107 By this
ideology, the Meiji oligarchs were able to politically justify (to the rest of the world) the
annexation of Korea in 1910.
Two events in particular can be said to have secured Japanese control over the Korean
peninsula. First, the secret envoy to the Hague peace conference in the Netherlands (1907)
carried out by Korean resistance who pleaded for “international declaration of Korean
independence.” 108 Not only was this mission unsuccessful, but the Katsura Cabinet viewed it to
be embarrassing on Japan’s behalf. As a result, by June of that year, Itō Hirobumi now the
Resident-General of Korea (an invented position that validated Japanese authority) forcefully
insisted that the current Korean emperor, Gojong, to step down in favor of his son, Sunjong.
“The Korean government was [forced] to accept...Japanese [officials] into [their] administration
as chief secretary to the cabinet, chief of the Home Ministry police bureau, vice-ministers of
departments, and judge.”109 This unwelcome change in administration led to frequent attacks on
Japanese civilians as a form of patriotic protest by Koreans. Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō
condemned these attacks to be a result of a lack of firmly established Japanese power in Korea.
His solution was to urge the cabinet to quickly annex Korea at Japan’s first suitable moment.110
The second event that swiftly brought about the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty (August 22,
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1910) was the assassination of Itō Hirobumi on October 26, 1909 by a Korean nationalist, An
Jung-geun, in Harbin, China. Now, Imperial Japan had successfully expanded its modernized
political regime to reign over a neighboring territory and proved again to the other world powers
their legitimacy as a small global power.

The Fight for Expansion in East Asia

For the relatively new empire of Japan, the Russian occupation in Manchuria since 1900
had long been considered a problem; the majority of Japanese leaders interpreted Russian
presence as a threat that could potentially destabilize Japanese national polity. Foreign Minister
Komura argued that Japan “would never enjoy security in Korea,” and “Russia [would] create a
sphere of influence which would exclude ‘all foreign enterprises and ventures other than [its]
own.”111112 The longer Russia retained its sphere of influence in Manchuria, the wearier Japan
became of Russia’s intentions, especially with their Eurasian and Manchurian railways.
Therefore it became essential to dilute as best as possible Russia’s hold on Manchuria; the
annexation of Korea was one solution. The protégés of the oligarchs saw fit to approach the
Manchurian problem with swift military action that would lead to eighteen months of violent
bloodshed with Russia that granted victory at the cost of necessary human resources and
financial means needed to fuel further Japanese imperialism. Japan settled in their secret treaty
with Russia for a secured sphere of influence in the southern hemisphere of Manchuria (Russia
maintained the northern hemisphere) while accommodating the already established “Open Door”

111

Yoshihisa Tak. Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Asia Center, 2001), 32.
112
Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 79.

41
policy in China.113 The question now was not what Imperial Japan should do next, but how to
continue the national cause of bringing the Japanese to the green pastures of civilization and
power.
The Meiji oligarchs had set a Westernized political regime into motion with the
development of Japan’s first Constitution in 1889. The kintei kenpō (constitution granted by the
emperor) “belonged, if to anyone, to the oligarchs who had controlled its drafting and hoped to
control its operations.”114 The oligarchs were elevated to the official status of genrō, elder
statesmen, and while their opinions on political actions still held absolute authority, there was a
growing restlessness with oligarch clique ruling; they were unwilling to share their power with
“popularly elected representatives.”115 The transition from the Meiji period (1868-1912) into the
Taishō period (1912-1926) brought around a political turnover in Japan, centered around the
symbolic representation of the Constitution, a clash between the “clique government” and
“constitutional government.”116 The clique government represented past political ideology
invented by the oligarchs and their protégés while the constitutional government encompassed a
more democratic system supported by an anti-bureaucratic public; the House of Representatives
from the branch of legislation. The mass media, having established their role to be the voice of
mainstream public opinions, weighed in heavily on the rising dispute of constitutionalism.
Huffman states that the written press focused on “representing popular moods” and the more
popular newspapers highlighted public opinion, a voice that could not be extinguished.117 One
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significant repercussion from the political standoff was the Japanese military manifested into an
independent faction and would come to hold significant command over the government during
the 1930’s up until Japan’s defeat in 1945.
In October 1911 revolution broke out in China that threatened the security of Japan’s
achievements in Manchuria. “The Qing dynasty, which guaranteed Japan’s treaty rights and its
foothold in Manchuria, had been easy to deal with [for Japan], but its fall from power introduced
new uncertainties.”118 Tanaka Giichi, a general in the Japanese Imperial Army, and Yamagata
Aritomo viewed this outbreak to be beneficial to Japan as it was “a golden opportunity”119; while
China fought with itself, the Japanese army hoped to take Manchuria completely, but also
planned for further continental expansion. And while the Japanese politicians divided themselves
to support either the Qing dynasty or the revolutionaries, the general consensus on China’s
revolution hoped that the end result would produce a “China friendly to Japan.”120 In other
words, a China that would essentially permit Japan to do as it pleased.
When World War I erupted three years later in 1914, Japan would take control of German
occupied territories; from the Japanese perspective this expansion was viewed as a strategic
success, but from a historical hindsight was not a wise move for the Japanese Empire.
“Committed imperialists would have to develop new ways of justifying an expansionist course to
their fellow Japanese, many of whom were losing their “appetite for empire.”121 For example, the
Ministry of Education, along with the army, attempted to counteract this waning civil morality
by building up schools to serve as a primary source of various ideologies pertaining to the
foundations of civil duty and the national mission, in essence different aspects of the emperor
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system. Schoolteachers were entrusted to become their local community’s “pillar of ideological
dissemination” and saw their profession of teaching as a mission.122 At the same time though,
Japan took full advantage of the vacancy in European presence in East Asia to usurp more power
and expand itself further. “While European powers wasted their resources and millions of young
men on war, the Japanese built ships, exported textiles, made industrial machines, and railway
rolling stock.”123 World War I was a very profitable period for Japan, but its overwhelming thirst
for expansion overall caused the global power to damage relationships with Britain and the
United States; too many Japanese lives were sacrificed in order to ensure a complete victory in
various military strategies, a recurring theme that plagued their imperialistic schemes.
The Twenty-One Demands that were delivered by Japan to the Republic of China in
1915, were a political ploy that aimed to dominate Manchuria and the Chinese economy, are a
prime example of nearsighted agenda that did not fully consider the possible consequences, such
as a considerable Chinese backlash towards Japan or that Japan would lose favor with its ally,
Great Britain. After the Japanese commandeered German spheres of influence in Qingdao and
the Shandong province, they proceeded to try and turn China into a puppet state of Japan; by
drafting unreasonable demands such as appointing Japanese advisors in key government
agencies, they intended to only favor themselves and deny foreign powers from receiving aide if
necessary.124 Matsusaka Yoshihisa, professor of Japanese Imperialism, notes two important
results, the first being that the Twenty-One Demands aroused suspicion from Britain and
America and the two Western powers would keep a very watchful eye on Japan. The second,
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more important, result was what Japan actually gained from their aggressive strategy125; the right
to lease land in Manchuria for 99 years on a renewable basis. By doing so, Japanese emigrants
would have full immunity from the Chinese judicial system. “These arrangements implied the
establishment...of a dual system of law and administration in Manchuria, one for Japanese, the
other for Chinese.”126 In this way, the foundations for Manchukuo, a future Japanese region,
were set in place.

1920-1940: Military Propaganda for Manchuria

One shortcoming of the imperial project in the Taishō Period was that its political leaders
were unable to instill the same level of passion and love for the Taishō emperor as the oligarchs
had engineered for the Meiji emperor. The ‘Japan’ that the Meiji oligarchs, former samurai
discontent with their leaders of the Tokugawa Period, had envisioned and then manufactured was
distorted in the democracy of the Taishō regime. Ian Buruma details, “The Taishō emperor,
Yoshihito, a feeble-witted man, inspired none of the awe enjoyed by his father [Meiji emperor],
even as a symbolic figure.”127 Therefore his son, Hirohito, was forced to become his regent in
1926 which brought Japan into the Showa era, the period of a “bright” Japan that would last until
his death in 1989. The pre-World War II period saw the rise of a politically totalitarian agenda i
which tennōsei ideology, the ultra-nationalistic sense of being, was reaffirmed into the hearts of
all Japanese citizens. The will of Emperor Hirohito became the will of the people and everything
done was done for the sole sake of the emperor, a living god.
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When Emperor Hirohito ascended the throne on December 25, 1926, Japan was in the
midst of an economic depression. World War I had accelerated Japan’s industrial production,
shifting gears from agricultural labor to white collar office work and blue collared factory labor.
Japan concentrated its attention on industries such as mass shipbuilding to export to their
Western allies to drive rapid growth of domestic economy. But this business investment was
only profitable as long as there was war. “The government leadership failed to institute adequate
measures to adjust the economy after World War I.”128 In fact, the entire duration of the 1920’s
faced terrible hardships with a significant decline in the agricultural workforce and blatant
political corruption.129 Masataka Kosaka describes the corruption as “unabashed pork barreling”
with political parties only drafting temporary solutions that were made for immediate action and
did not include any sort of long term plan. 130 The combination of economic stagnation and
unscrupulous politics resulted in a gradual gap of prosperity between rural and urban areas of
Japan as well as extreme indignation from the rural class who were forced to live in
impoverished areas. This resentment did not go unnoticed by the military, who valued the rural
areas because they consistently provided human and material resources.
The onset of the economic depression in the 1920s cast Japan’s once clear future of
global eminence into murky waters of uncertainty and anxiety. Rising national debt halted all
official plans to expand across the continent and with corrupt politicians focused on remaining in
power, the public was slowly losing their conviction in the imperial cultivated lifestyle.131 The
Meiji oligarchs had oriented their political crusade to restore the imperial monarchy and bring
about a completely modernized nation state that far exceeded the achievements of the Western
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powers. Emperor Hirohito, to ensure continued national wealth, envisaged a Japan where the
military and their achievements would “enhance the grandeur of the empire.”132 Under the
emperor’s imperial rescripts, the military was granted a privileged status which enabled them to
better cultivate power and eventually allow them to take control of the government. The military
from the 1930’s until 1945 would aim to restore the so called slippery term kokutai, “Japanese
spirit”133, the core of tennōsei. By re-institutionalizing teachings on emperor worship and the
essence of being ‘Japanese’ in school systems. Duus reports in his findings on right wing
conservatives, “elementary instruction put new stress on the idea of the emperor as a ‘living god’
and the country as a ‘divine land’” while government officials began to crack down on
“dangerous thought” like democracy and individualism.134
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 declared a limitation on naval construction which
was interpreted by the Imperial Army that there needed to be an increase in Japanese national
defense. From the military perspective, the higher officials within the Imperial Army felt that the
only means of protecting the homeland was to confront the United States via naval exchange in
the Pacific.135 This was only the beginning of imperial scheming under the pretext of necessity to
increase national defense. The Washington Conference not only restricted naval expansion, but
also caused concern among the Japanese at the lack of proper global acknowledgment of their
stake in Manchuria. Military propaganda gripped the nation, after the Japanese Army expanded
further into Manchuria, convincing the mass public to believe in and support the cause that
Japan’s only means of survival (through its economic slump) was to expand across the continent;
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Manchuria was recast as an “economic ‘lifeline’...rich in land, resources and opportunity.”136 For
the national cause of self-preservation, an intense war fever broke out at the beginning of the
1930s just in time to support the new surge of imperial jingoism that led to a series of aggressive
military attacks in China and eventually Japan’s defeat at the hands of the United States in 1945 .
On September 18, 1931, an explosion occurred near the tracks of Japan’s South Manchurian
Railway. This event came to be remembered as the “Manchurian Incident” in which the Imperial
Army (Kwantung Army) falsely staged an attack on themselves in order to further invade China.
The Osaka Asahi reported:
“...in an act of outrageous violence [bōgyaku], Chinese soldiers blew up a
section of Mantetsu track located to the northwest of Beitaying [Military
Base] and attacked our railway guards. Our guards immediately returned fire
and mobilized artillery to shell Beitaying. Our forces now occupy a section of
the base.”137
Before the Imperial Monarchy could contain the plans of the Imperial Army, the Kwantung
Army had already mobilized their units to advance past the territorial limitations arranged in the
treaty of Portsmouth. It is worth mentioning that the emperor had not approved of this plan nor
did he know it was going to happen until after the face; the Imperial government considered the
attack to be a form of insubordination. “[Hirohito] was not seriously opposed to seeing his army
expand his empire. If that involved a brief usurpation of his authority, so be it- so long as the
operation was successful.”138 On the looming battlefield, the Kwantung Army had declared that
“all Chinese soldiers were bandits, and all bandits Chinese soldiers”139 and therefore was
obligated to ‘secure’ Manchuria using as much force as deemed necessary. With only five
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hundred Japanese troops, the Imperial Army managed to overwhelm a Chinese unit of seven
thousand. Within five days, Japanese forces succeeded in occupying around five different cities
of Northern China. The Imperial Japanese central government was taken aback by their Army’s
insubordination, but immediately sent back up infantry divisions to support Japan’s victories. For
the first time, Japan had struck fear into the Western powers as a very real potential future threat;
where the Western world had once been impressed by Japan’s swiftness to modernize itself, now
looked at the empire with contempt and distrust as Japan continued, unchecked, on its bloody
path into China.
A mere six months later in 1932, the Imperial Army established a puppet regime under
the name Manchukuo that they would make their primary base of operation for future plans
concerning China. Not only did the world powers refuse to acknowledge Japan’s authority over
Manchuria, but they also recommended, during a conference at the League of Nations, that Japan
withdraw its troops and return the territory back to China. This passive-aggressive attempt to
pacify East Asia caused Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations in 1933 and return to a
state of isolation. The consensus of the world powers at the League of Nations was conveyed
implicitly through the Lytton Report that confirmed in the minds of the Japanese that the
Western powers did not want Japan to be its equal.140
The Manchurian Incident accelerated the end to the Open Door policy that had been in
effect since 1889 and served as a catalyst for change in domestic politics. During the time the
League of Nations spent trying to handle the China situation, the Imperial Japanese Army had
managed to chase out the Soviet Union from northern Manchuria; as a peace offering to avoid
conflict, the Soviet Union handed over their rights to the Chinese Eastern Railroad. While the
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military organized themselves to combat Chinese resistance, the mass public began to organize
themselves into radical right-wing fascist groups that fully supported the military’s strict
interpretation of kokutai. This is not to say that all of Japan turned into advocates for the rightwing national kokutai propaganda. Duus reports that between the years 1932 and 1936,
membership to the “patriotic associations, national socialist political parties, and crank rightwing study groups” doubled in size from 300,000 to 600,000.141 The Special Higher Police,
activated in 1911 to control political groups and ‘dangerous’ thinking, favored the efforts of the
radical right-wing, which placed emphasis on the emperor’s sacredness, by constantly badgering
members of left-wing. “Japan’s imperial madness was fueled by mass entertainment and the
popular press...the Jazz age was replaced by marching songs [such as] ‘The Imperial Army
Marches Off,’ or ‘Military Spy Song,’ or ‘Ah, Our Manchuria.’”142 Such a romanticized sense of
nationalism from the mass media exaggerated, to the public, the significance of Manchuria’s role
as a ‘lifeline’ for Japan; this continuous idealized theme of ultra-nationalistic styled media would
come to negatively impact Japan when Emperor Hirohito would announce to the Japanese
people, over the radio, Japan’s unconditional surrender on August 15. 1945.
Until 1945, the Imperial Army continued to experience great success as a military force;
their success represented the culmination of Japan’s (and by extension the emperor’s) ultranationalistic sense of self in East Asia. Under a Pan-Asia ideology, the military sought out to
unite their acquired territories, which consisted of Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan, under the
emperor as the other Asian states were considered to be already the emperor’s subjects. Shinichi
Kitaoka, a former ambassador to the United Nations and a historian, cites 1933 Japanese foreign
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policy (shown below) that encompassed an attempt at, but ultimately ended unsuccessfully in
creating a Pan-Asian world.
“Under the leadership of the Japanese Empire, a relationship of alliance and
cooperation should be formed among Japan, Manchukuo, and China, so as to
secure permanent peace in the Fast East and contribute to promotion of world
peace.”143
The height of the Imperial Army’s brutality would manifest itself as the beginning of the second
Sino-Japanese War in 1937; known historically as the Marco Polo bridge Incident, but formally
referred to as the China Incident by the Japanese. This day in history marked official exchange
between Japan and China that would last until Japan’s surrender to the West. The China Incident,
subsequently followed by the Nanking Massacre towards the end of the year, revealed to the
world powers the extent to which Japan would go to in order to protect its foreign interests.
While Japan claimed to be acting for the cause of self-preservation against Western imperialism,
it is quite clear that Japan had become greedy and whose imperial appetite knew no bounds; the
thrill of conquering and victories had Japan lusting for more and more of China, which would be
its downfall as Japan expended an excess amount of resources to secure each victory.
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Chapter Three: A Democratized Postwar Japan

Japan, towards the end of the 1930s was at the height of its military power and would
continue to pillage and defile China until 1945, justifying its brutality with the cause of a PanAsian sphere free from Western authority. As Japan invaded further into Manchuria, national
policy was continuously modified in its wake because the invaded areas of Manchuria were
politically considered to be Japanese; this prevented foreign nations from interfering.144 The
United States viewed Japan with contempt but was unable to act accordingly because its own
foreign policy did not allow the western superpower to intervene with another nation’s affairs.
Only when the Imperial Army wrought the devastation of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941
was the United States finally able to act and counter Japanese radicalism in East Asia. At the
Potsdam Conference (August 2, 1945), prior to Japan’s eventual surrender, President Harry
Truman of the United States and Prime Minister Clement Atlee of Britain cautioned the Japanese
government to “surrender unconditionally or face ‘utter destruction’.”145 But Prime Minister
Suzuki had believed that in accepting the terms of the proclamation, Japanese imperial
sovereignty would be in jeopardy and therefore ‘silently ignored’ the Potsdam Declaration.146 At
the same time, even with no clear sign of absolute victory, the Imperial army refuted the notion
of a peaceful compromise with the West; the Japanese troops had invested over a decade’s worth
of expansion efforts in Manchuria all for the sake of the emperor and Japanese national pride.
Dropping a nuclear bomb on the Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (August 6 and
9, respectively) destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives. Following Japan’s unconditional
surrender, the Japanese empire was immediately brought to an end as the Allied Occupation
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from 1945 to 1952 demanded Japan be demilitarized and democratized. Japan would not be
welcomed back into the international community until they had proved themselves to be a civil,
democratic, society. But even then, controversy would arise on whether or not the emperor
should be held accountable for his role in the war. Quickly, Emperor Hirohito faded from the
public’s eye while his son, the Crown Prince Akihito, became the new face of a post-war
modernized Japan. The mass public flourished in the economic booms of the 1960’s, particularly
the middle class, as they migrated away from emperor-centric ideology and learned to indulge in
luxuries for themselves. It was not until the death of the emperor in 1889 that Japan became one
again as war time memories resurfaced and the public remembered Emperor Hirohito’s
sovereignty as a sacred entity. In this chapter, I will explore the image of the emperor and the
conflicting moralities of the emperor system in terms of internal and external values in postwar
Japan, leading up to the war and then subsequently everything that followed and attempt to
demonstrate the paradoxical reality of tennōsei ideology; in indoctrinating state orthodoxy that
made internal values (i.e truth, justice) rely on national values, it was impossible for the mass
public to perceive Japan's radical war actions to be anything but righteous.

The Road to Defeat

Before I begin to discuss the reality of postwar Japan that was a direct product of the
emperor system, I will explore the years 1940 to 1945 and focus on how tennōsei ideology
influenced Japan’s totalitarian aggression across the continent as well as convince the nation the
actions of the Imperial Army were justifiable:
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“The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are
geographically close, historically, racially, and economically very closely
related to each other. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one
another’s need for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote
peace and progress in their regions.”147
This speech delivered by Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō in 1940 introduced Imperial Japan’s
latest scheme to justify further expansion across the continent; expansion now included European
occupied territories such as French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. The Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere was intended to unite regions of South and East Asia and create a “selfsufficient economic bloc.”148 This economic sphere would, of course, be led by the Japanese who
planned to liberate the territories from “imperialistic, exploitative control”, in other words
Western occupation.149
What was conveniently omitted in this imperialistic propaganda was that the invaded
nations were expected to understand their “proper role” in the Sphere while at the same time in
order to facilitate ‘co-prosperity’, it was imperative the Imperial army and naval could establish
bases of operation; which would entail nations to “recognize Japan’s real power.”150 By January
1942, Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō had qualified the plan to the House of Peers, as such: “The
object [is] to create ‘an order of coexistence and co-prosperity based on ethical principles with
Japan serving as its nucleus,’ [With the exception] of areas which were ‘absolutely essential for
the defence of Greater East Asia’ would be held under Japanese rule.”151
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This new wave of Japanese foreign policy contradicted its ostensible goal of promoting a
unified Asia in that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on one hand proposed an ideal
community filled with mutual rewards, but on the other hand was clearly designed with Japan’s
self-interest in mind; it was impossible to achieve true co-prosperity. This plan ultimately aimed
to build a new empire under Japanese rule, while also securing Japan’s survival and place on the
world stage as a legitimate global power.
Simultaneously, the Japanese government had also signed the Axis Pact, which
politically aligned Japan with Germany and Italy for the remainder of World War II; this
decision was meant to deter the United States from inserting itself into either the European war
or Sino-Japanese affairs. The Axis treaty ensured Japan’s fated clash with the United States
which wrought the devastation of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and subsequent American
retaliation on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The continuous escalation of military aggression
in China only pushed the Western powers, the United States in particular, to further sympathize
with the Chinese; the exact opposite of what Japan wanted.152
The ways in which the Imperial Army enforced the teachings of kokutai (national polity)
meant that if any government official was even to suggest the notion that Japan hold off its
invasion of China in any capacity, it would be considered as dishonorable to the emperor. Duus
cites the example of Takao Saitō, a member of the Constitutional Democratic party, who
suggested to the Diet that Japan did not have the necessary means to defeat China at that time
and was immediately expelled.153 In other words, any attempt to defuse and or hold off on
military operations, even if doing so would benefit the imperial mission later on, was met with
national scorn. To withdraw troops from any occupied territory implied that the sacrifices made
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were done in vain; it was unacceptable; it just was not going to happen. In order to better
understand the emphasis placed on upholding the teachings of tennōsei ideorogii (emperor
ideology), I will explore briefly the ‘tunnel vision’ atmosphere which was a direct product of
ultra-nationalistic mentality, in Mizuki Shigeru’s manga, Onwards Towards Our Noble Deaths.
This manga gives us a rare example of insight into the ideologies of the Imperial Army from a
Japanese point of view; in particular the manga illustrates the feelings of the conscripted
Japanese troops who were deployed to the front of the battle zone. It demonstrates how emperor
centered nationalism applies to the soldier’s self-consciousness in which he innately desires selfpreservation.
The manga is set in 1943 and details the last few weeks of the author’s infantry service in
Kokopo, New Britain in the South Pacific. In the manga, his unit is instructed by the General of
the Imperial Army to die for their country instead of returning home alive; this meant soldiers
only had two options: to die fighting the enemy or to take their own life if they survived the final
attack in Rabaul. The Lieutenant-Colonel of the infantry, Tadokoro, is portrayed as a very
serious man whose actions embody the ideals of kokutai; he upholds tradition, honor, and
absolute fealty to the Empire. To contrast Tadokoro’s patriotic nature, the infantry is compiled of
men who are less enthusiastic about being stationed on an island; they are often severely
reprimanded for slacking off; and they sing along with the prostitutes, who are also stationed
with them, the “Prostitute’s Lament” as they perform their military duties:
I am a blossom that falls in the
red-light district.
Wilting in the day, blooming at
night.
Can't hate nasty johns.
Forced smiles for smug pimps.
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Why am I stuck working this shitty
job.
No way out, all for my parents.154
The hierarchy and dissatisfaction of the infantry reveals the structure of the Imperial Army as a
whole. The highest ranked officers fully understood Japan’s imperial mission and believed it to
be a righteous endeavor. Whereas the soldiers carried out their patriotic duties because national
polity asserted that, for the sake of Emperor, going to war was a necessity. The “Prostitute’s
Lament” embodies the sorrows on the women who are trapped on the island and abused, but can
also apply to the infantry’s situation which is why the enlisted men sing along. The soldiers ‘wilt
in the day’ because they must perform their military duties when all they want to do is eat good
food and sleep, which takes place during night. The ‘nasty johns’ and ‘smug pimps’ could also
refer to the infantry’s commander and most likely the higher ranking men in the Imperial Army,
neither of whom they were allowed to outwardly hate, but both of whom they were forced to
very publicly respect. The soldier’s burden is reflected in the final line, fighting “all for [their]
parents” that embodies the ideology of tennōsei and translates as the soldier fighting solely for
the sake of the emperor.
To raise morale among his men, Tadokoro repeatedly compares their roles to the
supposedly inspirational story of five hundred men who died fighting alongside the 14th century
samurai hero, Dai-Nanko, to defeat enemy rebels. In this way, the infantry is taught to respond
positively to the notion of dying and self-sacrifice; it was an honor to die for the Empire. The
infantry, especially the ‘rookies’, are also taught to appreciate receiving discipline. “New recruits
are like tatami mats, the more you beat them, the better they are.”155 Therefore, by enduring
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rough treatments, soldiers would ultimately improve their characters which then somehow would
make Japan better as a whole.
The third segment of Mizuki’s manga, “The Death of Sergeant Honda” opens with
Tadokoro heading a strategic meeting at the Japanese headquarters in Rabaul. “The enemy went
around and took the river from the rear, they have now surrounded us,” Tadokoro says, “The
only option left at this point is a noble death.”156 None of the other captains are able to dissuade
Tadokoro from carrying out a mass suicide charge, regardless of the logical counterarguments. It
is revealed in the next scene that the General of the Imperial Army has given orders to Tadokoro
to hold the plateau; the Captain again repeats his idea of sending the troops to hide in the
mountains to prolong the battle, but Tadokoro denounces the very notion of retreating as
shameful.
Mizuki personifies Tadokoro’s character to echo the values and traditions of the Imperial
Army. It is clear from this dialog that the most important ethic to uphold is honor; every
movement a soldier makes, he must do honorably because he is an extension of the emperor and
under the impression the emperor is always watching his subjects. The ultra- nationalistic
mentality validates suicide as a noble death. On one hand the General of the Imperial Army is
saving his men from “dying a dog’s death”, should they choose to face the enemy another day.
On the other hand, suicide is also justified as noble because the soldiers would sacrifice
themselves for the emperor’s sake, thus maintaining Japan’s sacredness. Returning home alive
was condemned with shame as it would dishonor the sacrifices of the dead.
Mizuki characterizes the underlying theme of his manga as a juxtaposition of morality of
the group ‘spirit’ versus the individual ‘spirit’; represented in the tension between the officer
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class and the enlisted men. This tension addresses the issues of the unwavering social hierarchy
within the Imperial Army. Tadokoro insists the only logical course of action is to take his men on
a mass suicide mission, even though he is aware the outcome is not favorable for Japan. The
soldiers are then forced to choose between their instinct for self-preservation and their
understanding that a soldier’s duty is to follow every order given.
In the final chapter, “Noble Death”, Mizuki explores these conflicting moralities of
internal values. Tadokoro has died as he planned, but the Captain, who is severely injured, has
survived along with some of his men, who are carrying him back to Cape St. George. Despite
being alive, the Captain is grim as he comes to accept his reality that his survival is an
unacceptable disgrace, even though he had been adamant about not dying alongside Tadokoro.
“We were ordered on a suicide charge. How could your Captain have the audacity to show his
face alive?”157 From this line of dialog, we can learn two things: first, the Captain is unable to
listen to his own conscience; the second, once an order has been issued it not only transcends
individual thought, but it takes on the urgency of national values. Maruyama Masao describes
this phenomenon as such: “The entire national order is constructed like a chain, with the
Emperor as the absolute value entity; and at each link in the chain the intensity of control varies
in proportion to the distance from the Emperor.”158 The Imperial Army resided right under the
Emperor’s command and therefore was perceived to be the closest link to the sovereign that,
according to Maruyama, rationalizes why orders from the Imperial Army transcended the will to
live; it was almost like being ordered directly by the emperor.
The Captain leaves his subordinates with a paradoxical order to retreat; a soldier must
follow his superior’s command, but to retreat is dishonorable while continued survival is
157
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perceived as taboo by the Imperial Army. The purpose of analyzing this manga was to
demonstrate the degree of control of the Imperial Army, which they exerted over their forces to
preserve Japan’s national polity, and to explore conflicting modes of consciences brought about
by the emperor system. This will become more relevant in the next section of the chapter, when I
discuss Japan’s defeat and the repercussions of the imperial regime.
The Imperial Army’s brutality and continuous cruelty in China shocked the international
community. To combat Japan’s imperial expansion and to support the Chinese resistance, the
United States, Britain and the Dutch East Indies restricted oil exports into Japan, thus crippling
the Army’s advancement within China. Imperial Japan faced an ultimatum: withdraw troops
from China or engage in warfare with the United States. To withdraw from China went
completely against Japan’s own moral values of tennōsei ideology on emperor worship.
Therefore Japan could only continue forward which would eventually bring them face to face, on
the Pacific Ocean, with the United States. Attacking Pearl Harbor was classified by the Cabinet
to be an act of self-preservation while simultaneously an act of nationalism, for the sake of
Imperial Japan. The bombing of HIroshima and Nagasaki, subsequently followed by Japan’s
unconditional surrender, abruptly marked the end of Japanese imperialism and left Japan to
rebuild itself from the ashes of defeat into a newer modern nation state that Western powers
would approve of.

The Road to Redemption: Post WWII Japan

It was almost noon on August 15, 1945, when overwhelming urgency spread throughout
Japan. The emperor was to make a personal broadcast over the radio at exactly noon. Since
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Emperor Hirohito’s ascension to the throne in 1926, his subjects had only heard their god
through his imperial rescripts (printed text) which were then read aloud by other people. It was a
day that could never be forgotten. John Dower, a professor of Japanese history, recounts a letter
detailing the emotions that followed after the Jewel Voice Broadcast. It was written in 1994 to
the Asahi Shinbun by Aihara Yū, a farmer’s wife living in Shizuoka prefecture. When a
messenger appeared in her village informing everyone the emperor would be speaking shortly,
Aihara prepared herself to be ready should the emperor ask her to join the war.159 After all, the
Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), which had been ingrained into every school child since
its creation, stated that:
“Should [any] emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State;
and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval
with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects,
but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.”160
The radio crackled, distorting the emperor’s voice and making it very hard to understand his soft
spoken voice. Furthermore he spoke in very formal, sophisticated, Japanese which only
increased confusion to everyone listening. The announcement was very short, only lasting four
minutes, and did not openly state that Japan had been defeated, merely the war “did not turn in
Japan’s favor, and trends of the world were not advantageous to [Japan].”161 Coincidentally there
happened to be a man from Tokyo, in Aihara’s village, who understood the context of the
emperor’s speech and he quickly translated the message to everyone. Immediately everyone fell
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to the ground, weeping.162 Japan had lost the war, but it was more than just losing that had
submerged a nation into deep sorrow. Hirohito’s broadcast had evoked severe feelings of guilt
and shame from his subjects who felt that in losing the war they had personally failed the
emperor. The American Occupation that would begin the following month on September 2nd,
and would attempt to liberate the Japanese from “an ideology [that] contributed to their war guilt,
defeat, suffering, privation, and present deplorable condition.”163 I will now review the emperor
system, which was created to accelerate Japan onto the Western stage, in order to discuss Japan’s
reintegration into the post World War II modernity.
When the Meiji oligarchs began the imperial project to restore sole power to the emperor,
it was for three reasons: the first, the Tokugawa shogunate failed to maintain their power when
confronted by America which was then perceived to be a weakness in leadership and called for
change; the second, after Japan had been exposed to Western culture, the Meiji oligarchs began
to envision a Japan that would appropriate some Western traditions in order to be considered
‘modern’ and then Japan would surpass the Western nations; the third, in order to convince the
mass public that modernizing Japan was in everyone’s best interest, glorifying the image of the
emperor was a necessary component.
The way in which the oligarchs envisaged promoting the emperor system (tennōsei)
would require rewriting traditions and values to reaffirm the intricate relationship between the
emperor and his subjects. In trying to create a modern state, Japan came to believe that they were
the land of the gods and that the emperor was a living descendent from the sun goddess
Amaterasu. Douglas MacArthur described the Japanese as being “abject slaves to mythological
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fiction.”164 Maruyama Masao states that these ideologies produced by the emperor system lacked
a solid foundation and instead relied on slogans praising the emperor’s sovereignty to validate its
authority.
In developing the Imperial Rescript on Education (October 1890) and the Meiji
Constitution (November 1890), the oligarchs intended to provide a substantial agency for their
imperial orthodoxies, which created a national sovereignty that legitimized itself through
“spiritual authority and political power.”165 Maruyama draws upon Carl Schmitt’s analysis on
European nationalism (one of the prototype models the oligarchs envisioned) to rationalize the
severe repercussions of Japanese ‘ultra’ nationalism after their defeat at the hands of the United
States.
“...an outstanding characteristic of the modern European States lies in its
being ein neutraler Staat...the State adopts a neutral position on internal
values, such as the problem of what truth and justice are; it leaves the choice
and judgement of all values of this sort to special social groups...or to the
conscience of the individual. The real basis of national sovereignty is a
purely ‘formal’ legal structure, divorced from all questions of internal
value.”166
This was not the case for Japanese nationalism. The oligarchs did not spend time in quantifying
matters of the state (the external values) and matters of the people (internal values) and instead
focused their orthodoxies to control the internal values. In this way, with the Emperor
representing a culmination of all national values, virtues and truth, the mass public thereby
became an extension of his own conscience. As I pointed out previously, in the manga Onwards
Towards Our Noble Deaths, the conflicting morality of following a suicide order is an example
of how the emperor system manipulated internal values to reflect state orthodoxy. The Captain
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had been ordered by a higher-ranking officer, Tadokoro, to face the enemy with the intention of
dying in the process which he failed to do. Ultimately he has to take his own life or defy the
Imperial Army therefore defying the emperor.
The emperor system validated power and morality based on the social proximity to the
emperor.167 For example, the Imperial Army was under the direct control of the emperor which
“led them to conclude they were superior to other members in the community, not only in their
position within the hierarchy, but in all values.”168 The closer to the emperor one group was, the
stronger their morale. Vice versa, the further away one group was from the emperor the less
power they had over others. Mizuki demonstrates this power dynamic is his portrayal of
Tadokoro and the enlisted men; Tadokoro is enthusiastic about upholding honor and take his
position very seriously while his enlisted men are not very motivated to fight, but only do so
because it is their duty as soldiers to follow orders of their superiors which is to defend Japan
from the enemy.
In a memoir about a Japanese soldier who self-surrendered to the Americans in 1944 and
subsequently became a prisoner of war, Mr. Kojima recounts being selected to represent the
Japanese POW’s as opposed to the highest ranking Japanese POW who was “an army major
[who] talked proudly about the women he’d raped every time the Japanese army occupied a new
area.” Mr. Kojima ends his experience as a POW with hope that the younger generations would
realize how absurd the war was. “I want to make [Japan] a land where people think and live on
their own. I was very briefly a captive, and while living as a prisoner of war I learned about
democracy and freedom.”169
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Japanese ultra-nationalism restricted public thought to pertain only to upholding the
national values. In other words, free thinking was engineered to be unanimous and rely on the
values of ‘national polity’; essentially personal values were to reflect the emperor’s values.
Chapter II, Article 29, in the Meiji Constitution states that “Japanese subjects shall, within the
limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations”,
but the ideologies of the emperor system countered this ‘liberty’. For the emperor’s subjects
were conditioned to “never forget that even in [their] personal lives [they] are joined to the
Emperor and must be moved by the desire to serve [Japan].”170 Therefore when Japan lost the
war and the emperor’s divinity was “formally denied in an Imperial Rescript” in 1946, the mass
public was left to rebuild its beliefs, for the first time, free from any direction or restrictions.

The Arrival of the Americans: the Allied Occupation, 1945-1952

Kawachi Uichiro, a Yomiuri newspaperman, remembers very clearly the arrival of the
first Americans in Tokyo, after Japan’s surrender. To his astonishment, the first Americans to
drive straight into the capital were journalists. It was an unforgettable moment as the jeeps came
to a stop and some reporters rushed to greet old friends, Japanese reporters they must have met at
a previous time. Kawachi watched as everyone mingled together in a relaxed atmosphere; the
American reporters were very friendly and acted like America and Japan had never fought. The
most memorable, astounding moment for Kawachi was watching the Americans sit on the
emperor’s throne, in the House of Peers, while simultaneously taking pictures of each other.
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Kawachi said, “When I saw that, the idea of defeat really sank in! Sitting in the Emperor’s seat,
that’s something none of us could ever had imagined.”171
The Allied Occupation set out to accomplish two objectives: to demilitarize Japan and
then democratize the sovereign ruled nation. With General Douglas MacArthur as supreme
commander of the Occupation, the United States controlled all aspects of policy making and
power in Japan. At the end of his command, MacArthur commented, “I had not only the normal
executive authorities such as our own President as in this country, but I had legislative authority.
I could by fiat issue directives.”172 It was imperative to the United States that their policies
ensured a democratic future for the Japanese by “eradicating the very roots of militarism.”173
Dower notes that this ambitious reform, even by the standards of being victorious in war, was not
legally justified. The Americans sought to reeducate the mass public with the result that a society
in which “the ‘will of the people’ prevailed” was created and the “will to war” was eliminated.174
This meant attempting to completely rip the Japanese away from the ideologies of the emperor
system which were already deeply cemented into their minds, an impossible task, “[Japanese
ultra-nationalism succeeded in spreading a many-layered, though invisible, net over the Japanese
people, and even today they had not really freed themselves from its hold.”175
The ‘revolution from above’ and their radicalized agenda for a democratic Japan began
with MacArthur’s orders to reinstate freedom of political expression on October 4, just a month
after the Americans had arrived. By doing so, “the Special Higher Police, or ‘thought police’ of
the Home Ministry were abolished. The heads of the Home Ministry and the national police
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force were purged. Political prisoners were ordered released from jail.”176 This meant that
anyone could speak their minds without fear of retaliation by police. Most notably was how fast
the mass media began to openly condemn “the wartime regime and its leadership, and debated
why Japan had gone so wildly astray.”177 Conversely though, when it came to implementing a
more liberal education for schools, the United States placed great censorship in material related
to, “imperial divinity, Japanese racial superiority, or patriotic myths and legends,” and suspended
classes that related to “ethics, Japanese history, and geography,” until new textbooks, that had
been given the American stamp of approval, could be distributed.178 The idea behind censoring,
what can be classified entirely as, Japanese history was that the reform hoped to instill values of
democracy and the necessity of a democratic government while also teaching young students
how to be an individual thinker. Higher education became more easily accessible to the general
population while mandatory education extended until the ninth grade. Duus notes that with the
installation of a liberal education came the retirement of many teachers, but this left their vacant
positions open to freshly graduated university students eager to engage in post-war ideas of
liberalism.179
The greatest achievement during the American democracy reforms was the drafting of the
new national charter that “codified the basic ideals of ‘democratization’ and weeded them to
‘demilitarization’ by explicitly prohibiting Japan from resorting to war as a means of resolving
international disputes.”180 The rewritten constitution completely denied the divinity of the
emperor and the authority of an emperor centered state, instead the emperor was returned to a
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mere “symbol of the state and the unity of the people,” who would only act in ceremonial rituals
of the state. But the revised role of the emperor brought to question whether or not he should be
tried as a war criminal. He was allowed to retain his position as the emperor which was an
ambiguous decision and perceived cautiously by Japan’s neighbors. Henceforth, Hirohito was
recast to be a “democratic civilian monarch,” traveling around Japan in Western clothing to greet
his subjects, appearing to be just like the rest of society.181 From the Occupation until the 1964
Tokyo Olympics, Hirohito faded from the public’s eye and his son, Crown Prince Akihito,
became the new poster child for a rehabilitated, civilized Japan.

Japan Re-Emerges onto the International Stage

Crown Prince Akihito symbolized the beginning of a new cultural revolution for Japan;
he would come to embody the democracy America envisioned for a, civil, society. As a teenager
during the Occupation, Akihito was taught by an American Quaker, Elizabeth Vining. Unlike
Emperor Hirohito, Crown Prince Akihito continued his education in a relatively normal setting;
he went to school with other boys his age instead of enduring an education in solitude because he
was royalty. The appeal to Akihito’s image was his social assimilation into society, with his
peers and others. In the eye of the public, and the world, Akihito was a model Japanese citizen,
ordinary like his classmates and easy to relate to; whereas the mass public could never truly think
of Hirohito as anything but their sacred emperor.182
1953, just a year after the Occupation ended, Crown Prince Akihito embarked on a six
month world tour. Before setting out to visit the Western Powers, the Imperial Household
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Agency made sure to thoroughly research all regional customs in order to prepare Akihito to
make the best impression in his debut to the world. “Sandē mainichi described the crown
prince’s trip as an opportunity for him to show pacifist Japan’s true form to the world.” Kenneth
Ruoff remarks that this observation seemed to imply that Japan’s actions from 1931 to 1945
were nothing more than a phase that hid the “pacifistic nature of the Japanese.”183 With the
Japanese news media reporting almost every detail of Akihito’s trip, Japan was restored with
hope for the prosperity of their nation. The United States, especially, received Akihito with
enthusiasm and friendliness. “[Japan] felt relief and joy at the crown prince’s success in
representing a New Japan to the world.”184
Come the year 1958, the crown prince would shock Japan in his decision to marry a
woman of commoner status, Shōda Michiko. No one of the imperial family had ever married
anyone who was not of high status. The public enthusiastically cheered for the love between the
crown prince and princess. The wedding between royalty and middle class symbolically united
“the imperial house to the Postwar Constitution and [subsequent] the people to the postwar
polity.”185 Following the successful marriage, the royal family as a whole became the object of
attention for the mass media; they were the public’s favorite role model. “Portrayed as the model
of white-collar domesticity” the royal family set the living standards for the middle class which
became better known as “my family-ism.” Like how during the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese
began wearing western clothing as a show of being modern, the new modern lifestyle that was
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exemplified by the royal family required things such as a love for sports and being
knowledgeable on the current fashion trends.186
In fact, Japan underwent a complete ‘lifestyle’ revolution starting in the mid 1950’s
through the 1970’s, inspired by mass media coverage of the royal family, in particular the media
portrayal of Crown Princess Michiko was very successful with women. In preparation for the
imperial wedding between the crown prince and princess, Ruoff reports that within the estimated
audience of fifteen million, majority chose to watch the ceremonial parade from their television
(a symbol of middle class wealth); from within that group, many had purchased a television just
for the royal occasion.187 Japan experienced “a mass migration of people from the rural to the
urban areas,” which led to a huge increase in mass demand and consumerism.188189 For example
the accumulation of the television, the refrigerator and the electric washing machine became
standard items within the middle class household and represented a thriving postwar economy as
well as personal status. Migrating away from emperor centered nationalism, the economic boom
encouraged self-indulgence and improving the quality of home lifestyles.
“Today Japanese do not wear clothes to protect themselves from the
elements; they do so to make themselves look beautiful...Japanese no longer
eat to live...The emphasis in Japan today is on how to enjoy food...sex is
regarded as an important means of enabling people to enjoy life; it is no
longer tied to marriage, reproduction, or love.”190
The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 bolstered industrial productions like “the new high-speed bullet
trains...jumbo jets...high-rise building complexes,” but also, more importantly, brought waves of
hope for the post war Japan. It was a new beginning, but not without haunting memories of
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destruction and despair of the Pacific War. On one hand hosting the Olympics meant welcoming
Japan back into the international community, symbolizing a ‘rehabilitated’ peoples. “The
emperor declared the opening of the games, and with well-orchestrated fanfare, reappeared on
the world stage as the leader of a fully rehabilitated Japan.”191 Irokawa Daikichi describes this
‘rehabilitation’ to be the transition from a “charismatic wielder of authority to a member of civil
society.”192 On the other hand, construction of the Olympic stadium, and even then the opening
ceremony, linked an economically successful Japan to bittersweet memories of the mass
mobilization of college students (October 21, 1943) to fight the Western enemies.193

The End of Showa

In regards to the emperor system, Post war Japan found itself divided in opinions. For the
generations who had been indoctrinated in the imperial orthodoxy, “some were unwilling to
forgive the emperor and the emperor system,” and therefore demanded for the abolishment of the
emperor system in Japan’s democratic society. But for the younger generations, impact of ruling
under the emperor system was understood with indifference. Surveys conducted by Irokawa to
his students regarding the emperor, just as he fell gravely ill, showed that they believed Japan
needed the imperial family. In his students’ eyes, the imperial family represented the only
Japanese who stayed true to tradition and whose ancestry was irrefutable. Irokawa concluded,
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based of his surveys, that the younger generations “did not perceive the emperor system in a
hierarchical sense,” and instead viewed the emperor to be on their level.194195
While the middle class enjoyed the luxuries that came with Japan’s economic booms and
the government worked relentlessly to bring a democratized Japan back into the good graces of
the Western world, the rest of Japan was left to figure how to assimilate into a post war,
‘modernized’ Japan. The emperor ideology that Japan was one with itself and everyone should
work together for the sake of the emperor had dissolved during the Occupation. Now the public
worked to benefit the individual rather than the group. “Japan was a harsh, inhospitable place for
anyone who did not fall into a “proper” social category.”196 This meant that the victims of the
war, children without family, women without husbands, civilians severely affected by radiation
and mercury poisoning and military veterans, were not recognized as being members of society;
they were labeled as ‘improper strangers’ and therefore society had no reason to concern
themselves with the affairs of outcasts.
With this notion of thinking, it was impossible for the victims of the war to ever become
‘proper’ members of society because it was their situation, that was a result of the war, that
automatically made them improper. A report in 1948 placed the census for orphaned or homeless
children to be at 123,510; girls often found themselves being forced to turn to prostitution while
boys were forced to engage in delinquent behaviors in order to survive on the streets. Widowed
women were looked down upon; there was no sympathy that she was without her husband. But
the people who were treated with the utmost cruelty were the veterans who returned home.
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“Veterans suffering from battle shock were commonly shunned. Disabled veterans were doubly
stigmatized, having lost the war as well as their physical or mental wholeness.”197
The public maintained the belief that the returned veterans failed to win the war for Japan
and that the ex-veterans should have committed honorable suicide rather than come home.
Irokawa explores the accounts of two Japanese who endured the public’s indifferent attitude in
order to stress the severity of the emperor system. In their desperate moments, Sakanoue Yuki, a
victim of mercury poisoning, and Yokoi Shŏchi, a formal Corporal left overseas, began to
envision the emperor to be their only savior from their pain; the emperor's status as a living god
was exaggerated in their minds. For the disregarded members of society, they could only but
continue to believe in the emperor system, to hope that the emperor alone could save them from
their despair.198
The death of the emperor on January 7, 1989, put Japan into national mourning. Prior to
his death, when the emperor fell ill in 1988, the mass media went into a panic state and wrote
about the nation being in a “sombre self-restraint.” With the fluctuation of the emperor’s health,
Japan switch back and forth between feelings of relief and then concern; the media was to cover
every detail and there was to be no comments criticizing the emperor.199 Calling the inevitable
death to come “X-day”, Japan more or less returned to its previous ways of condemning anyone
who spoke out against the emperor; Hirohito was once again viewed as being a sacred entity.
Irokawa speculates, “Perhaps [the media] was afraid of being labeled ‘Un-Japanese’” if they
published articles pertaining to imperial slander.
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Emperor Hirohito died believing firmly that throughout his reign as emperor he was a
descendant from the sun goddess Amaterasu and that his subjects loved him until the end. The
emperor’s sense of being had been concretely shaped by the mythological ideologies the Meiji
oligarchs had created so long ago that evoked passionate feelings of love and loyalty from the
public. Japan essentially halted in its tracks as memories of Showa prosperity, pre 1945, came to
the public mind. Nothing but right-wing praise for the emperor emerged in the newspapers.
Under the emperor’s sovereignty, Japan had become the single, most powerful East Asian
nation.200
The United States envisioned a postwar Japan that would eagerly embrace the attributes
of a democratized society such as freedom of speech and individualized thinking; the
reformation of the post war society aimed to discredit and erase the emperor system in favor of a
liberal atmosphere. The result of the Occupation produced a new social caste-system in which
society was divided between “proper” citizens and “improper” outcasts. The middle class
flourished from the reformation and the youths were indifferent towards indoctrination of
liberalistic ideologies, but the victims of the war suffered tremendously from the intense
transformation of postwar Japan; the reeducated society forsook their once “heroes” of war and
stigmatized the rest of society who could not adjust to modernity of postwar Japan. The death of
the emperor brought back overwhelming feelings and memories of Japan’s century worth of
endeavors to become a first rate nation.
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Conclusion: Thoughts on Imperial Japan
My original senior project intended to analyze the status of contemporary Japan in
relation to its East Asian neighbors and the United States. In order to even begin a commentary
on contemporary Japan, it was necessary that I trace the conception of modernity in Japan.
When Commodore Perry arrived with his black ships in Uraga Bay in 1853, the
Tokugawa shogunate were incapable to deny the demand for open trade exclusively with the
United States. This failure was perceived to be a weakness in leadership that gave rise to a
rebellion for change. Led by ambitious samurai hailing from Satsuma, Chōshū and Tosa clans,
the Tokugawa shogunate were overthrown therefore resulting in the end of the Tokugawa period
and the beginning of the Meiji era. The intentions of these samurai, who would become the Meiji
oligarchs and create ideology that would enslave the nation for nearly a century (1868-1945),
was to ultimately create a Japan that would surpass the achievements of Western empires. My
first chapter traces the foundations of the emperor system and analyzed how Japan was recast as
a “superior” nation descended from gods.
The emperor system relied heavily on re educating the nation to understand their
relationship to the emperor. The notion that the emperor was sacred took precedence in the
restoration of imperial leadership. The Meiji oligarchs set out to legitimize the emperor system
by fabricating traditions and by drafting political documents that essentially reiterated the
emperor’s divinity by the nation’s duty as subjects to the emperor and legitimized the state. By
doing so, the emperor became a volatile image and the emperor system then depended on
continued indoctrination of the state. I found that it was not the emperor himself who the people
were manipulated into believing, but his image as a sovereign ruler that the Meiji oligarchs based
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the emperor system around. Emperor centered nationalism revered the emperor’s symbolic
identity.
As Imperial Japan transitioned into the 1900s as the leading East Asian nation, the
success of the imperial army began to spread and the Japanese citizens became more enthusiastic
about the imperial project. Success was directly linked to the emperor’s sovereignty which then
deepened the nation’s bond to the emperor’s image and motivated people to embrace their role as
a citizen. The United States and Britain were very impressed by Japan’s achievements in
modernity as they had previously viewed it to be a “backwards” nation. The following war with
Russia and then subsequent annexation of Korea arguably placed Japan on the world stage.
My thesis for this project explored the construct of the emperor system and how it
enabled and justified Japan to expand across the continent. I was interested in answering the
question of how the state was able to convince itself a Pan Asia ruled by the emperor was a
righteous endeavor. By reading Peter Duus’ historiography on modern Japan, I came to the
conclusion that the emperor system corrupted and controlled moral values of truth and justice in
order to continue expanding across the continent. By making truth and justice a matter of the
state, it was impossible for an individual to form their own thoughts on Japan’s aggressive
warfare. Emperor ideology maintained that the national values were also the people’s values and
in this way became paradoxical.
Regarding Manchuria, Japan won rights to the southern hemisphere after its victory
against Russia. From expanding into foreign territories of Korea and Manchuria, Japan began to
develope a taste for power and began to view the other Western occupied territories as threats
against Japanese security. After enjoying continuous prosperity, the 1920 economic depression
caused the nation to panic. The people doubted the legitimacy of emperor centered nationalism
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and wondered if all of Japan’s progress would dissolve. Therefore Japan’s stake in Manchuria
was advertised as an economic lifeline in which Japan had to firmly secure from the occupied
northern hemisphere of Russian influence.
From 1920 to 1945, the Imperial Army radicalized itself and in the process the nation.
China was portrayed as being unequal to Japan as well as being oppressed by the West. Japan
sought to liberate China from Western influence and when the government was rebuffed, Japan
violently retaliated. The Imperial Army employed aggressive totalitarian warfare in order to
expanded Japanese control intro China; even going as far as to to stage an attack on itself. What
surprised me in my research were the memoirs of Japanese soldiers during this violent period.
They talked about how they thought the war was redundant but participated in it because the
ideology of the emperor system mandated it so. I used Mizuki’s manga to show how the Imperial
Army functioned; the higher ranked officers really advocated for the nation’s mission while the
enlisted men couldn’t openly disagree to anything or they would be labeled a traitor. Ultimately
Japanese soldiers were trapped and had to follow orders. The continuous radical warfare of the
Imperial Army eventually became too extreme even for the Western powers to watch and
subsequently the Japanese Empire suffered humiliating defeat at the hand of the United States in
1945.
During the postwar years of Japan, Emperor Hirohito shocked the world in his statements
about the war as he apologized for trying to “liberate” Asia. He was not tried as a war criminal,
but faded from the public’s eye as a prominent figure until the opening of the 1964 Tokyo
Olympics. Meanwhile Japan underwent democracy reforms as the Allied Occupation set out to
erase emperor ideology and replace it with liberal education. In my reading of John Dower’s
“Embracing Defeat” he talks about how the reforms of the Occupation were on the same level of
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extreme as the indoctrinations of imperial culture. I was surprised to learn that the Occupation
included banning Japanese history textbooks while supplementing Japanese schools with
Western written textbooks on Japanese history; I do not agree with this methodology of reform
as it conflicts with the very nature of the liberal education the Occupation intended for Japan.
But on the other hand, there was the question of how to rid the nation of imperial orthodoxy
without radical action.
My final thoughts on the emperor system are that it exploited a nation into believing they
were superior for the wrong reason. The Meiji oligarchs insisted on the idea that Japan was the
land of the gods and from this mythological origin, the nation was brought to believe they were
entitled to “rescuing” East Asia. And because they were descendants from gods, it was
impossible for the nation to be in the wrong which impaired their ability to graciously accept
defeat. Instead, postwar Japan has become a divided nation, separated into different social
categories. Especially the veterans of the Pacific War who were once hailed as heroes were
condemned by society as being failures because Japan lost the war. Emperor ideology dictated
that the victims of war were at fault and that society should not concern themselves. Emperor
Hirohito, when speaking about the Pacific War, framed Japan’s actions as attempting to liberate
East Asia and was unapologetic.
Imperial Japan emerged as the first modernized East Asian nation and impressed the
Western world as a sophisticated empire. Their belief that the rest of East Asia should be united
under the emperor ultimately brought their imperial reign to an end when the United States
bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The democratized Japan, like the Meiji oligarchs,
appropriated Western culture to reinvent itself as a newly “rehabilitated” nation and once more
returned to the world stage.

78
Bibliography and Works Cited

Akita, George. Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

Anderson, Benedict R. O. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. Rev. and Extended ed. London: Verso, 1991.

Beasley, W. G. Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Beasley, W. G. The Meiji Restoration. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972.
Bernd Martin and Wetzler Peter. 1990. “The German Role in the Modernization of Japan — the
Pitfall of Blind Acculturation”. Oriens Extremus 33 (1). Harrassowitz Verlag: 77–88.

Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York, NY: Harper Collins
Publishers, 2000.

Buruma, Ian. Inventing Japan, 1853-1964, 12. New York: Modern Library, 2003.

Cook, Haruko Taya., and Theodore Failor. Cook. Japan at War: An Oral History. New York:
New Press, 1992.

Daikichi Irokawa, The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan. New York: Free Press,
1995.

Doak, Kevin Michael, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan Placing the People. Leiden:
Brill, 2007.

Duus, Peter, Modern Japan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998.

79
Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W.
Norton &, 1999.

Fujitani, Takashi. Splendid Monarchy Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996.

Gluck, Carol. Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1985.

Gluck, Carol, and Stephen Richards. Graubard. Showa: The Japan of Hirohito. New York:
Norton, 1992.

Huffman, James L. Japan and Imperialism, 1853-1945. Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian
Studies, 2010.

Huffman, James L. Creating a Public: People and Press in Meiji Japan. Honolulu, HI: University
of Hawai'i Press, 1997.

Ienaga, Saburō. The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World
War II. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Igarashi, Yoshikuni. Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 19451970. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Irokawa, Daikichi. The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan. New York: Free Press,
1995.

Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2000.

80
Jansen, Marius B., and Gilbert Rozman. Japan in Transition, from Tokugawa to Meiji. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Lee, Yong-ch'ul Ha, and Clark W. Sorensen. Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea, 19101945. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013.

Maruyama, Masao, and Ivan I. Morris. Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics.
London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Mizuki, Shigeru, and Jocelyne Allen. Onward towards Our Noble Deaths. Montréal, Quebec:
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